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Abstract 
C. S. Lewis’s novel, Till We Have Faces, has been misunderstood by both scholars and readers 
alike. This paper seeks to read the text through the lens of Lewis’s own literary criticism. It 
begins by presenting Lewis’s fundamental dilemma of the mind, the rift between the rational 
and the imaginative faculties. Lewis posits myth as a “partial solution” to this problem. This 
paper traces Lewis’s ideas from his early position on myth as “beautiful lies” to the more 
nuanced, later position where myth is connected with terms like “truth,” “reality,” “fact” and 
“history.” Using the text of “On Stories,” and the chapter “On Myth” from Lewis’s book An 
Experiment in Criticism, this paper argues that Lewis, because of the basic elusiveness of 
mythic experience, steps into the use of story or narrative as a provisional solution for the 
dilemma of the mind. This is then applied to Till We Have Faces, arguing that the story is not a 
myth or an allegory, but a realistic novel with a hidden mythic reality, a Lewisian narrative that 
fulfills his requirements of Story. A close reading of Till We Have Faces connects the text with 
Lewis’s realism of content and realism of presentation. This reading then places the text within 
the problem of rationality set against imaginative reception. Till We Have Faces is a test case 
for Lewis’s extensive ideas about Divine Myth, its hiddenness behind and within narrative, and 
its power to heal a divided mind. The narrative of Till We Have Faces, for the main character 
Orual, as well as for the receptive reader, comes to embody the transformative power of extra-
literary myth within the containment of word-dense, tensed story. 
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Dabney Adams Hart has correctly identified myth as the key component of C.S. Lewis’s works, 
noting, “Lewis’s idea about the function of myth in the human imagination was the heart and 
core of all his writing in every form” (Through 8-9). Myth is, one might say, the “master key” to 
Lewis’s ideas, just as myth itself, according to Lewis, is the “master key” hidden within a story 
that can be used on any door in a reader’s imaginative realm that he might wish (OTOW 115). 
Defining myth, however, has proven to be both divisive and elusive, eliciting a whole range of 
reactions, from the negative dismissal of myth as a fabricated (and thus meaningless) structure of 
primitive religion to the search for the mythopoeic and the creation of modern-day mythologies 
in an attempt to escape an abstracted world.1 The prevailing equation within most of these 
definitions, and among the first reactions to the word myth itself, posits myth as the equivalent to 
falsehood, unreality, and baseless assertion. Many dictionaries, including the OED, list a 
bipartite definition, labeling myth either as a “traditional story” (usually with supernatural 
components) that explains or justifies the beliefs, history, or rituals within a particular society or 
as an “erroneous story,” a fiction that results in a “misrepresentation of the truth” (“myth” 1a, 
2a).  
The mid-twentieth century bulge in myth-criticism within literary theory is positioned 
around thinkers like Mircea Eliade, Joseph Campbell, and Northrop Frye2 following the earlier 
                                                
1 The recent surge of mythopoeic entertainment in pop culture is an example of the mass-market appeal of alternate 
worlds that contain their own mythological underpinnings. Examples include the Harry Potter books and movies, the 
re-workings of fairy tales like Snow White, and the recent surge in vampire-themed novels and movies. 
2 Hart, in her work titled Through The Open Door: A New Look at C. S. Lewis, considers Lewis to be “avant-garde 
as a critic” who positions myth as primary in literature before Joseph Campbell, Mircea Eliade and Northrop Frye’s 
work on myth (12). Michael Ward, in Planet Narnia also mentions these three scholars in conjunction with Lewis’s 
view that “there are certain foundational archetypes that recur in cultures the world over and throughout history” 
(230). 
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anthropological interest in mythology within the scope of primitive societies (that is, by Frazer).3 
Not only does Lewis precede and anticipate this preoccupation with myth within the scope of 
literary studies, but also he is well aware of the prior anthropological focus.4 Lewis’s own 
definition of myth, however, is the result of a man following an idea that haunts him for his 
entire life. As such, it is not easily reducible to a single definition, and is complicated by subtle 
changes throughout his lifetime. For instance, the early, and oft-quoted line of Lewis’s defines 
myth entirely along the popular falsehood strata, where myths are only “lies breathed through 
silver”—beautiful, but limited in the fact-bound harshness of daily life (Carpenter 147).5 This 
must be balanced with another commonly quoted line from a later, fictional work, where Lewis 
describes mythology as “gleams of celestial strength and beauty falling on a jungle of filth and 
imbecility” (Pere 201).6 Then mythology, a mix of “gleams” among the earthly soil, comes to 
focus when Christ, the eternal Myth, enters history and becomes “fact” in the Incarnation (GID 
66).7 Lewis increasingly seems to associate myth more with terms like “reality,” “truth,” and 
“fact” rather than with the early equation of myth as beautiful lies.8  
Lewis’s ideas about myth show up in all the forms of writing he undertook: private 
correspondence, public lectures, literary reviews, literary essays, poetry, fictional works, 
                                                
3 In Lewis’s essay “Religion without Dogma,” he mentions various views of mythology. Among these, he lists 
Frazer as an example of mythology “as imitative agricultural ritual mistaken for propositions (in the days of Frazer)” 
(GID 131). This passage will be discussed further in chapter two. 
4 See Marjorie Wright’s introduction to her dissertation, The Cosmic Kingdom of Myth: A Study in the Myth-
Philosophy of Charles Williams, C.S. Lewis, and J.R.R. Tolkien, as well as Dabney Adams Hart’s book Through the 
Open Door: A New Look at C. S. Lewis. Hart notes that Lewis may precede these thinkers in regards to myth, but 
“the increasing interest in the nature and function of myth cannot be attributed to Lewis” (145). Though Lewis’s 
work was overshadowed by that of Frye and Campbell, Hart argues for the importance of Lewis’s place in literary 
theory.  
5 Lewis is reported to have said this phrase in a conversation with J. R. R. Tolkien and Hugo Dyson on the night of 
19 September 1931 (Carpenter 147); Walter Hooper also mentions this conversation and its long-reaching effects in 
his preface to the collection of essays titled Of This and Other Worlds (14-15). 
6 This is part of Ransom’s musings on mythology in Perelandra, written in 1943. 
7 This comes from Lewis’s essay “Myth Became Fact,” published originally in World Dominion, vol XXII (Sept-Oct 
1944), p 267-70. 
8 These terms will be distinguished in a later portion of this paper, but for the purposes here, they must be 
emphasized simply as being important to Lewis’s ideas about mythology. 
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Christian apologetics, and autobiographical materials. From the start, myth resided in the 
category of imagination for Lewis, “a many-islanded sea of poetry and myth” within his mind 
that stood in sharp contrast to rationalistic critical thinking that he employed in his work (SBJ 
138). He began noting this division: myth on one side, propositional statements on the other; 
imagination standing against reason; enjoyment of experience opposed to the contemplation of 
that enjoyment. Myth seemed to recede constantly out of view, an elusive taste that seemed 
drained of meaning once codified in words. This became, for Lewis, a major dilemma—the gap 
between the sign and the signified seemed impossible to breach. 
C. S. Lewis’s fictional work, Till We Have Faces, is situated at the end of a career 
devoted to myth. The subtitle of the work places it immediately in this context: “A Myth 
Retold.” On the surface, it would seem straightforward. Lewis, like many others, has attempted a 
retelling of the Cupid and Psyche story taken from Apuleius’s work titled the Metamorphoses, or 
The Golden Ass. Yet Lewis’s book has been difficult to classify, garnering labels like the 
obvious one, “myth,” but also “allegory,” “fairy tale,” “romance,” “historical fiction,” and 
“modernistic novel”.9 The most persistent, of course, is that Lewis is simply retelling the original 
myth in a new form but still in a mythic framework. Till We Have Faces, then, is often classified 
as “A Myth Retold as Myth.” 
In light of Lewis’s own position on myth, this is not enough, and clearly there is 
sufficient disagreement to warrant another look. On the continuum of genre terms, “allegory,” 
“fairy tale,” and “romance” could arguably be close to the term “myth,” but “historical fiction” 
and “modernistic novel” are much more difficult, if not impossible to reconcile with myth. A 
                                                
9 This listing of classifications for TWHF will be probed in more detail in a later chapter. Early reviews mistakenly 
called the text “allegory,” but Lewis specifically took issue with that, insisting in a letter, “it isn’t an allegory” (CL 
III 1090). Favour for the text as a “modern novel” or some kind of “historical fiction” is popular in more recent 
criticism. See Chapter four of this paper for specifics. 
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new term needs to be introduced at this point. Using Lewis’s own terms, specifically tied with 
his essay “On Stories,”10 and the chapter “On Myth” in An Experiment in Criticism, the word 
Story is a solution. Since myth, for Lewis, was an ‘unwordable’ transcendental reality, one could 
not write a pure myth. A container is needed to hold and convey myth to the reader. Lewis labels 
the container as “narrative” or “story.” The grand story, for Lewis, is a vessel for what he 
considers the one true myth—the incarnation, dying, and resurrection of a god. Story, then, is the 
human narrative; myth is the divine reality hovering behind (and yet not separate from) the text.  
Till We Have Faces contains the Cupid and Psyche myth, as it would normally function 
as part of a sacred ritual, put into the mouth of the priest in Essur, in Part II of the book. Yet to 
the main character, Orual, the myth is a corrupted, overly simplified version of her history: a slap 
in the face by the gods (TWHF 214). Orual, and the reader glancing over her shoulder, are 
gradually led to the real myth, the great region hidden beyond and yet within the story itself. 
Lewis is not retelling the Cupid and Psyche myth as myth, but as Story. In the book, Orual tells 
her story, and then retells it—this brooding on her own history, however deceptive her memory 
may be, begins to shape and change her perception. In the retelling, the truth gradually gathers to 
a focus, solidifying the myth into human story and finding a form that the reader can inhabit 
more directly.  
First, however, we need to review the dilemma, the essential problem we have as we 
attempt to confront and catch the experience of the imagination in words. Lewis’s division 
between the reason and the imagination will be the substance of chapter one. The second part of 
this chapter will posit myth as a partial solution (the position Lewis comes to in the essay “Myth 
Became Fact”)—a potential bridge for the brokenness of our souls.  
                                                
10 Found in the essay collection titled Of This and Other Worlds. 
   
 5 
Chapter two will go deeper into Lewis’s position on myth, following the path through 
pagan mythology, and then to the turn provided through the Incarnation. Chapter three will move 
into Lewis’s concept of Story, defining the term and noting the characteristics that he mentions. 
Myth, though a “partial solution” to jump the gap in the mind and person, is ultimately 
inadequate for humans stuck in a time-bound world. Glimpses into mythical reality give 
meaning, but we cannot reside in myth or bring it down to practical, earthy environs. Story, then, 
is Lewis’s provisional solution, a way to bring myth down into human history in a livable reality.  
The fourth chapter applies Lewis’s position on myth and story to Till We Have Faces, placing 
 
the text within Lewis’s categories of “realism of presentation” and “realism of content” found in 
 
An Experiment in Criticism. The final chapter continues the exposition of Till We Have Faces,  
 
moving more specifically into the life of Orual and the transformation she finds through her  
 
participation in story. Orual’s linear, intentional narrative presentation, filled with realistic detail  
 
creates an atmosphere that succeeds within Lewis’s own definition of Story. The book functions 
 
as a comment on, and application of, narrative that transforms. Orual lives the dilemma of a  
 
divided life, standing uncertain between imagination and reason, and choosing a rational legal 
 
complaint over the longing for the divine and a glimpse of myth through imagination. Stephen  
 
Crites’s article, “The Narrative Quality of Experience” is important here, as well as both Gilbert 
 
Meilaender and Mara Donaldson’s considerations of story. 11 All three provide portions of the  
 
foundation that we need for Lewis’s use of story and narrative as a vessel for myth in Till We 
 
Have Faces.
                                                
11 Gilbert Meilaender's article "C. S. Lewis and the Narrative Quality of Experience," and Mara Donaldson's 
"Orual's Story and the Art of Retelling: A Study of Till We Have Faces" are both found in the book Word and Story 
in C. S. Lewis (Columbia, London: University of Missouri Press, 1991).  
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Chapter 1: The Dilemma of a Divided Life 
Reason and Imagination 
 
C. S. Lewis calls the separation of the imagination and the reason a “dilemma” that plagues the 
mind (GID 66). In his poem titled “Reason,” Lewis recruits Athene and Demeter to illustrate the 
problem (Poems 81). Athene represents reason: she stands “on the soul’s acropolis,” “clear” and 
high (l. 1, 5). Mother Demeter, however, is “Warm, dark, obscure and infinite,” teeming with 
fertility; she is the imagination, deep and slumbering beneath the surface (l. 6, 9). The problem, 
though, is that the poet cannot make the “touch” of imagination “report the same” as reason’s 
“sight” and asks that another “make in me a concord” (l. 14, 12). Only then might belief be 
possible (l. 16).   
There is a marked difference in the character and actions of the mind’s resident 
faculties—Athene and Demeter. The intellect values knowing, and the ability to frame that 
knowledge into words. Its language is primarily “scientific,” an artificial, learned skill of 
speaking which translates to “theological” language when it ventures into the realm of religion 
(EC 261).12 This type of language is useful for “instruction, clarification, [and] controversy” and 
focuses on dealing with “facts” (EC 261). In the categories Lewis adopts from Alexander’s 
philosophy in Space, Time and Deity, reason resides in “Contemplation” and is one step removed 
from experience and “enjoyment,” turning reality into abstract propositional statements (SBJ 
174). Reason looks on, evaluates, critiques, and stands objective and high above the messy world 
of experience. “Reason” is also the name of the woman who frees John from the giant in Lewis’s 
early allegory, The Pilgrim’s Regress. She, reminding us of Athene in Lewis’s poem, is “a sun-
bright virgin clad in complete steel” (PR 68). “Reason” may be able to free John from a prison of 
                                                
12 These terms are found in Lewis’s paper “The Language of Religion.” He speaks of three types of language, 
“Ordinary,” “Scientific,” and “Poetic” (EC 255).  
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the narrow intellectual “Spirit of the Age,” but she cannot answer John’s question about the 
“Island in the West.” She can only tell John the things he already knows: “I can bring things out 
of the dark part of your mind into the light part of it. But now you ask me what is not even in the 
dark part of your mind” (PR 74). In his book, Miracles, Lewis repeats this concept, urging us to 
give up the reliance on reason alone: “For Reason knows that she cannot work without 
materials” (144). Reason may be able to deal objectively with the facts, but reason alone cannot 
obtain new data for itself. 
Lewis is concerned with a loss of meaning that comes when “factual realism is dominant” 
(WG 114). What happens, he wonders, if a man subjects his experience of love to analytical 
inspection? The results of such an analysis may begin to be viewed “as truer than his 
experience,” and serve to empty love itself of meaning (WG 114). The experience lives in a 
person’s imaginative realm, where love can be enjoyed (GID 65). During the experience, one 
stands directly in the sunbeam, in a state of “Enjoyment,” (as opposed to “Contemplation”), 
receiving the view that goes beyond the toolshed, up into the sunlight outside (GID 212).13 This 
image comes from another essay, Lewis’s “Meditation in a Toolshed,” where the reason is busy 
with “looking at” the sunbeam, a step away from the actual experience. Enjoyment occurs when 
a person experiences the light itself—this is what Lewis calls the practice of “looking along” 
(GID 212).  
In Lewis’s types of language, the “poetic” comes the closest to expressing the 
imaginative world. It endeavours to show the quality of a thing, to make visible the concrete 
reality that has been received through the senses (EC 257). Lewis suggests that “poetic” 
language may come the closest to a “natural language for religion” (EC 261). Mysticism and 
                                                
13 Lewis applies the terms “enjoyment” and “contemplation” that he got from Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity in 
the essay “Mediation in a Toolshed” found in the book God in the Dock. Here he argues that both are valid ways of 
looking. 
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spiritual experience break down under “introspection” and theological language (WG 106). Yet, 
in order to have any sort of religious debate, terms must be “as definable and univocal as 
possible” and thus end up abstracted, and separated from the thing itself (EC 261). The tension 
cannot be avoided. Lewis notes that even the teachings of Christ avoid theological language—
they are not given or organized in any “systematic fashion” that would appeal to our reason (RP 
112). Christ’s teaching “cannot be grasped by the intellect alone, cannot be ‘got up’ as if it were 
a ‘subject’” (RP 113). Christ taught through parable, paradoxes, and questions—methods that 
seem to slip out of reason’s grasp. This difficulty goes beyond spiritual matters: any emotional 
experience, like the man in love, contains untidy bits that the reason cannot fit easily into its way 
of thinking or speaking. There are things within experience that cannot be communicated 
through “scientific” or “theological” language, things that resist definition, hovering on the edges 
of thought. In fact, Lewis concludes, “the normal state of experience” is beyond our rationalistic 
attempts in language (EC 263). The world outside is larger than the world in our minds. 
Thus, according to Lewis, reason is by nature, limited.14 Lewis, however, is not 
suggesting a displacement or devaluing of reason. Reason must still be placed beside 
imagination; otherwise, belief would not be possible. Even if the divine is beyond our 
experience, Lewis would still have us attempt an understanding through words and analogy. The 
lower, natural, earthly images we have must be transposed into the higher images found in 
mythic and heavenly realms (WG 99). We must use what we have. Nevertheless, we should not 
be surprised if one image in the lower language is needed to stand for many things in the higher 
                                                
14 Peter Schakel, in his book Reason and Imagination in C. S. Lewis, traces the evolution of Lewis’s thought, 
finding that though he was concerned about both reason and imagination throughout his life, later in life he began 
privileging imagination over reason. Mark Freshwater, in his book, C.S. Lewis and the Truth of Myth, follows 
Schakel’s idea and traces Lewis’s gradual assimilation of ideas concerning the imagination and the supernatural. 
Kath Filmer, however, in the book titled The Fiction of C.S. Lewis: Mask and Mirror, argues that on several points 
(notably his views on the supernatural, and on women), Lewis’s beliefs remained consistent throughout his lifetime.  
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reality. In Lewis’s sermon titled “Transposition,” he insists that we cannot assume a “one-to-one 
correspondence” between systems—that would be allegory, not myth (WG 99).15 Elements in the 
lower system or language, like elements in our rational thought and earthly humanity, must carry 
more than one meaning in the higher system. The imagination has access to the higher system, 
sensing multiple meanings. However, when this new data is reviewed by the reason, it must use 
the same, limited signs of language and thought to somehow convey the vastness of the world 
beyond. Lewis calls the basic pattern “symbolism” in which letters and words (as signs) 
represent objects (the signified).  
A second process, which builds on “symbolism,” Lewis calls “sacramentalism”—
important in any attempt to understand Lewis’s concept of mythology and spirituality. In this 
process, the pictures in the natural world, which our reason is able to access, also exist elsewhere 
in Lewis’s heavenly or mythic realm. Lewis uses the example of a painting, which signifies 
something beyond itself, but the painting is also part of the real world. The sign stands alone, 
separate from the signified object (like in “symbolism”), but also is present within the signified. 
Thus, the sign, which is part of the lower system, is made richer by its place in the higher reality; 
meaning is deepened (WG 102). Anyone, according to Lewis, who approaches the mythic from 
the lower realm, believing only in the facts of the more restricted system, would be limited to the 
details that they can see clearly already in their reason. The mythic realm beyond would hold no 
meaning for them. However, if we allow the possibility for a density of meaning beyond any 
conception within the facts, then suddenly the facts themselves mean more—they become edged 
about with alternatives and significance. There must be some trust and acknowledgement that the 
higher realm is present before reason can give freedom to the imagination. 
                                                
15 “Transposition” was preached at the chapel of Mansfield College, Oxford on May 28, 1944. A section was added 
to the text in 1961 (WG 18-19). Owen Barfield believed that this essay outlines Lewis’s theory of the imagination 
and shows how his mind worked (Duriez 92). 
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It may be helpful to make a small digression at this point. The terms “reality,” “facts,” 
and the “concrete” need to be defined in order to clarify Lewis’s ideas. “Reality” is a term with 
degrees of meaning in Lewis’s work. This has caused some confusion in the past, so it needs to 
be cleared up right away. In his book, Miracles, Nature is defined as something real, the things in 
Nature are “concrete, individual, determinate,” objects that exist (131). The physical material 
objects all around us, and even our own bodies, “are not mere principles or generalities or 
theorems, but things—facts—real, resistant existences” (M 138). Further reading in Miracles 
makes it clear that these three terms interconnect, and appear almost synonymous. Charles Starr, 
in his article “Meaning, Meanings, and Epistemology in C. S. Lewis,” has an extensive footnote 
to clarify these terms. He places “facts,” “reality,” “events” (that which happens), history, and 
the “concrete” on the same plane.16 These, then, are the origin of the material through which the 
reason sorts. Reason, however, must constantly confront a problem: it cannot directly access the 
concrete world and must rely on the senses for input from that world. Once it has data, the reason 
produces “principles or generalities or theorems”—truths about the reality of Nature. Note that 
the terms “truth” and “abstract” do not reside on the same level with “reality” and “facts.” 
This is a start, but considering Lewis’s Neoplatonic thinking, it is not enough. He may 
call Nature “reality,” but it is not the “ultimate reality” (M 105).17 Nature “is not the whole of 
reality, but only a part” (M 107). This is the basis for Lewis’s argument on the existence of 
miracles. He insists that we should rightly demand that “all reality should be consistent and 
systematic,” a fundamental requirement of the reason (M 97). However, the very fact that some 
                                                
16 Charlie W. Starr. "Meaning, Meanings, and Epistemology." Mythlore 25.3/4 (2007): 161-189. Web. April 24, 
2012. Footnote on p 166. 
17 Detail about Lewis’s Neoplatonism can be readily found elsewhere, for instance, see Robert Houston Smith's 
book Patches of Godlight: The Pattern of Thought of C. S. Lewis (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1981). See 
also the chapter titled “The Christian Platonism of C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, and Charles Williams” by Mary 
Carmen Rose (found in the book, Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, vol 2). Further ideas are found in Lewis’s 
own writing—see the sections on Neoplatonism in his English Literature in the Sixteenth Century (319-322, 392). 
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things do not fit might suggest that there is a Reality beyond Nature that can account for the odd 
fragments. If miracles, or, for the purposes of our topic here—the experiences of the imagination, 
“are real, they must, in the very act of [interrupting] assert all the more the unity and self-
consistency of total reality at some deeper level” (M 97).  
Lewis uses the terms “reality,” and “facts” in a secondary sense to refer to the perfect 
Form somewhere beyond. For Lewis, this is God: the “Reality” that the intellectual ghost in The 
Great Divorce is not ready to meet (40). God is the “eternal, self-existent, rational Being” (M 
43), the “basic, original, self-existent Fact which exists in its own right” (M 46). Reality also 
refers to the ‘thing itself,’ the domain of eternity and heaven (WG 33). Nature is not the “self-
existent Fact” for Lewis, she is fallen, and needs redemption just like the human race (M 105). 
Later in Miracles, Lewis states that “God is basic Fact or Actuality, the source of all other 
facthood . . . If He exists at all, He is the most concrete thing there is, the most individual” (M 
145). The Form, outside our frame of time must be “itself concrete” in order for anything else to 
be concrete (M 138). The abstract cannot produce the concrete—Lewis’s example is the practice 
of bookkeeping (a task of the reason). Bookkeeping does not create money (the concrete object), 
but relies on money in order to exist (M 139). The lower fact is created by the prior existence of 
the higher Fact. Thus, just as the senses allow reason to work with the reality of Nature, so the 
imagination is needed to bring glimpses of the eternal or otherworldly Reality into the reason. 
When Lewis speaks of the imagination reflecting Reality or experiencing the Concrete, this 
refers to a connection with the source of all other reality. To make this clear, this paper will refer 
to Realities that exist outside “the little frame of earthly experience” with an initial capital letter, 
and the lower concrete facts with initial lowercase letters (Pere 147). 
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This, then, clarifies what Lewis said about the poverty of “factual realism” (WG 114). 
“Realism” is one step away from “reality,” an attempt of the reason to put the facts into words—
a lower system attempting to explain the higher system (the concrete love experience reduced to 
explanation). The difference between the terms “realism” and “reality” will be important later, in 
the discussion of story and narrative in chapter four. A “realistic” text attempts to portray the 
facts of reality in such a way that it almost seems to be reality itself. Lewis says that realistic 
texts are “constructs, entia rationis; not facts on a level with the here and now” like the man’s 
experience of love or the reality of so many papers to mark (EIC 69). When the facts are severed 
from experience and thus from reality, the imagination cannot be exercised and meaning is 
excluded. The man in love has artificially restricted himself to the reason, attempting “factual 
realism,” putting scientific language to use. Yet, there is nothing from beyond, nothing from the 
higher Fact system seeping in—that could only be attained through the experience and the use of 
the imagination. Any transcendental quality that love might have held dissipates, and the love is 
devalued.  
Lewis uses the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice to illustrate our dilemma (GID 66). 
Eurydice is the reality, the ‘thing itself’ that Orpheus has braved the underworld to bring back. 
As long as he looks forward, permitted only to hold her hand (and thus to use only the “exploring 
touch” of imagination), he can experience the concrete reality of his beloved. Yet it is not 
enough: he looks back at her, drifting into the comfortable, clear-sighted intellect. Eurydice is 
suddenly gone. She has become only an abstract concept in his mind, the real woman cannot 
continue to exist. He cannot have it both ways. The imagination, for Lewis, is able “to taste and 
not to know” (GID 65).  
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A further limitation of the reason concerns Lewis—reason relies on language to express 
and define the concrete/Concrete, but language itself is not a pure rational system. Lewis argues 
in the essay “Bluspels and Flalansferes” that all language is metaphorical in varying degrees. He 
is confronting the belief that “scientific” language can be pure, and exempt from any figurative 
origin. The real situation, he suggests, is not a “freedom from a given metaphor,” in language but 
a “freedom to choose between that metaphor and others” (R 151). Any attempt at producing a 
more literal language system, is only to “reshuffle the buried metaphors” that we have forgotten 
about (R 152). It is impossible to be strictly literal, and any attempt to purify language will only 
result in a reduction of meaning. The reason cannot speak alone; there will always be intrusions 
from “poetic” language and from the workings of the imagination. Lewis concludes this essay 
with the placement of imagination beside reason: “reason is the natural organ of truth; but 
imagination is the organ of meaning. Imagination, producing new metaphors or revivifying the 
old, is not the cause of truth, but its condition” (R 157). The reason’s strength is found in its 
ability to abstract truths, and in attempting a literal expression of those truths in language, but it 
needs the concrete experience as a prior condition of knowledge. Thus, any stated belief must at 
some point resort to “metaphor and symbol” (WG 133). This is especially true with “theological 
language” because it speaks about spiritual Realities outside of Nature, so the language 
“symbols” used “are not rationally but imaginatively understood” (Carnell, Bright 72). Michael 
Christensen, in his work titled C. S. Lewis on Scripture, sums up the dilemma: “The human 
predicament, on the deepest level, is man trying rationally to understand or consume a Reality 
which can only be imaginatively envisioned or spiritually tasted” (56). Consequently, according 
to Lewis, as soon as the reason attempts to speak about things beyond the “physical objects” in 
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Nature, it becomes “necessarily metaphorical” (WG 134). The very tool reason must use is 
complicated by layers of meaning, some of which are only accessible by the imagination.  
Thus, imagination powerfully adds to life, and makes knowing possible. The advantage 
of “poetic language” is that it gives us experiences that we have never had or may never be able 
to have (EC 260).18 It gives us a dim sight of the places beyond the clear map in our reason (EC 
260). Peter Schakel defines Lewis’s faculty of the imagination as a mental process that “connects 
things that were previously unconnected not through a logical or intellectual process but through 
association, intuition, or inspiration” (Imagination 4-5). Though it may seem that Lewis 
privileges the imagination at times, he recognizes that it cannot work alone. The imagination can 
receive and reflect the heavenly realm, but it is not “a step towards” it, only “an image” of the 
higher (SBJ 136). It contains “the shape of reality” but not the “thing itself” (SBJ 136). Since the 
imagination can only experience Reality, it can be no end in itself. Without the assertion of the 
will based on the deduction of the reason, there can be no belief. As the first step in the process, 
the imagination receives (and thus also trusts) Reality, and then the reason takes the new data 
and attempts definition. Finally, an assertion can be made. Lewis found for himself that the 
imagination “contained no element either of belief or of ethics; however far pursued, it would 
never have made me either wiser or better” (SBJ 136). The two faculties must work together. 
A further difficulty arises: what if the lower system of language operated by the reason 
cannot handle or even sort through the vast input coming through the imagination? Lewis 
believes that science and reason can only verify or falsify poetic language “in a limited degree 
and with a certain fringe of vagueness” (EC 260). Only small portions “out of the teeming 
                                                
18 Mineko Honda, in the book The Imaginative World of C. S. Lewis, outlines Lewis’s belief about the imagination: 
“It perceives the meaning of the world, expresses that meaning, and enables us to participate in the metaphysical 
Reality” (1). He classifies Lewis’s theory of the imagination as Romantic and compares it to the ideas of Coleridge, 
Wordsworth, and Proust. 
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complexity of every concrete reality” can be measured (EC 260). The “obscure and infinite” 
realm of Demeter cannot be fully framed in words. Somehow, some sort of “concord” must be 
created between the two faculties if belief is to be attained. Even here, though, if a temporary 
reconciliation is made and belief is entered, a problem persists. Lewis says that there is a 
difference between “imaginative enjoyment and intellectual assent” and suggests that belief may 
actually be hostile to the enjoyment of the experience (WG 120). Once enjoyment is codified and 
evaluated by the reason, can the soul move back into that wordless place and grow large again? 
Can the imagination work with material already residing in the intellect, already asserted to in 
belief? After the largeness and complexity has been simplified by the reason, is there a way to 
maintain the excess? Lewis uses the example of pagan mythology: once it was no longer a belief 
system, the poets could delight in its richness (WG 119). What Christian Europe did 
imaginatively with pagan mythology, they could not do with their own “heaven and hell” (AL 
83). The final stage in the reason, the yea, or nay, that equates to assent and belief seems to shut 
the door to fancy. The decision has been made, and no other variables can be admitted. So we 
live in our reason, safe with the facts we already know and believe. Yet, if meaning resides in the 
imagination, what happens in the soul when the imagination is buried and ignored?  
Something remains, Lewis believes, a vague, ill-defined desire. Lewis called it 
“Senhsucht” in his own life—a strange joy visiting from elsewhere. In other places, he called it a 
“desire for our own far-off country” (WG 29), or a longing for that “sweet dim Isle of Apples 
over the wide sea’s breast” (SIB 74).19 Other names for this desire include “nostalgia,” 
“Romanticism,” and “beauty”; those wordless whispers that we find in books, or in music (WG 
30). Lewis states, however, that what we desire does not reside “in them, it only came through 
them” (WG 31). We want something, and always more of it, but it is difficult to locate its source, 
                                                
19 From the poem titled “Death in Battle” (l.3). 
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to define its outline, or to keep it once we find it. “We want something else which can hardly be 
put into words—to be united with the beauty we see, to pass into it, to receive it into ourselves, 
to bathe in it, to become a part of it (WG 42). We want, in other words, a Concrete experience; 
we still desire the glimpses that the imagination receives. 
It would be helpful, at least for the reason, to be able to put that thing we want, that 
“something else” into words. In a letter to Joan Lancaster, Lewis responds to her story that she 
sent to him for critique:  
You describe your Wonderful Night v.[ery] well. That is, you describe the place & the 
people and the night and the feeling of it all, very well—but not the thing itself—the 
setting but not the jewel. And no wonder! Wordsworth often does just the same. His 
Prelude [. . .] is full of moments in which everything except the thing itself is described. 
If you become a writer you’ll be trying to describe the thing all your life: and lucky if, out 
of dozens of books, one or two sentences, just for a moment, come near to getting it 
across. (CL III 765-6)20 
In another letter, Lewis is astonished to find such a line in one of Owen Barfield’s writing 
projects: “It’s not like a passage in a book at all: it’s a thing” (CL II 173).21 The “thing” equates 
with Reality, a solid object that can only be approached through the imagination. In another 
place, Lewis gives “heaven” as an example of “the thing itself,” a place outside of our experience 
approached only through symbols that originate in our earthly reality (the lower system trying to 
transpose into the higher) (WG 33). Desire persists simply because the mind becomes barren 
without these glimpses, tired of its own neat systems and haunted by the memory of the past—
those times when the soul stumbled close to Beauty. We need the light coming into the toolshed 
                                                
20 June 26, 1956. Lewis is fond of italicizing specific words in his letters. This paper does not alter any of the 
italicized words in the letters. 
21 Dec 12? 1935 (Exact date is in question according to the editor of the Collected Letters). 
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from without, not only to give the reason something to attend to, but also so we can find our way 
in the dark. 
Myth as the “Partial Solution” 
 
In his poem, “The Future of Forestry,” Lewis wonders how the distant memory of the beauty of 
trees will be passed on to children and awaken in their imagination after all the trees are gone 
(Poems 61).22 Teachers will try to explain and describe them, but the children with “their ill-
acquainted / Fancy will tint their wonder-paintings” with goblins clothed in “silky green” and 
“wood romances” (l.19-22). The children, only “Half understanding” will, nevertheless, come 
closer to the image of a true tree than their elders—the ones who remember actual trees in nature 
(l. 19). The children will experience a sort of myth, removed from the history of trees, but closer 
to the ideal. Through their imaginations, they can “Catch from afar (for soul is watchful) / A 
sight of tree-delighted Eden” (l.26-27). While in the myth, the children will see more, sensing 
what the rest of us cannot see. 
Myth, according to Lewis, provides a bridge, connecting the “peninsular world of 
thought” to the continent of our belonging (GID 66). In the poem, the children see Eden through 
the mist of the tree myth, unfettered by rational descriptions that the grown-ups have in their 
heads. Each soul is watchful for that place beyond, and myth provides a solution for our “tragic 
dilemma” of the mind—a bridge where the soul can cross from reason into imagination (GID 
66). In his essay “Myth Became Fact,” Lewis comments that “in the enjoyment of a great myth 
we come nearest to experiencing as a concrete what can otherwise be understood only as 
abstraction” (GID 66). The trees, presented as an abstract concept, become alive and mysterious 
in the imagination, allowing the children to experience something solid beyond what their 
                                                
22 This poem was originally published in The Oxford Magazine, LVI (Feb 10, 1938). 
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physical eyes can see. In the words of Stephen Thorson, as he reflects on Lewis’s thought, the 
children are experiencing the “reality” of myth—it is not “truth in the sense of knowing that, but 
rather in the sense of knowing what” (3).23 Like the example of the trees, myth adds a “rich 
significance” to the simplest, everyday things: “By putting bread, gold, horse, apple, or the very 
roads into a myth, we do not retreat from reality: we rediscover it” (OTOW 120). Lewis believes 
that all these things held a glory once, but now all is “hidden by ‘the veil of familiarity,’” a veil 
that myth can tear away, at least for a time (OTOW 120). Lewis gives the example of a boy, 
stumbling upon a page of Milton, knowing nothing about the structure of the text, but finding, 
strangely, that some “new strength and width and brightness and zest have transformed his 
world” (PPL 61). This boy, like the children with their tree myth, “is nearer to the truth” than 
those who can explain how the text works (PPL 61).24  
We have a “predicament,” says Lewis, which is met through myth: “It will always work, 
on those who can receive it, the same catharsis” (OTOW 131). In a letter to Joy Gresham, Lewis 
comments on a book by Arthur C. Clark: “We are almost brought up out of psyche into pneuma. 
I mean, his myth does that to us imaginatively” (CL III 391).25 From the soul, up into the spirit, 
myth provides a temporary release from the human predicament—this earth-bound, restricted 
life. We live “in hac valle abstractionis,” the place of separation (GID 66). Myth is the mountain 
above, a place where concrete Reality exists, and the origin for our innumerable streams of 
abstract truths in the valley (GID 66). The many truths in the lower system are needed to piece 
together one solid idea in the higher. We must be prepared for “complexity, and contradiction, 
and repetition” not only in the material world, but also in the world of ideas and art, says Annie 
                                                
23 Stephen Thorson. "Truth, Myth, and Revelation in Lewis." The Bulletin of the New York C. S. Lewis Society 21.6 
(1990): 1-6. Print. 
24 In A Preface to ‘Paradise Lost’, Lewis hints at his mythic ideas through his discussion of poetic archetypes, 
explaining archetypes as the “words of a language which speaks the else unspeakable” (57). 
25 Dec 22, 1953. 
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Dillard (Living 171). One myth produces many meanings as it drops into our world, but 
someplace, up there on the mountain it is pure, simple, and concrete. “What flows into you from 
myth,” says Lewis “is not truth but reality (truth is always about something, but reality is that 
about which truth is)” (GID 66). We abstract truths from myth, but the myth itself lives the 
Reality. It is not a dichotomy between truth and lies, where myth is a lie that nevertheless 
clarifies our sight for the real truth in the valley. The truths we live by and believe cannot be 
abstracted from their opposite, falsehood; they must come from something greater, something 
more Real. The great myths are not lies that tell the truth, but realities that produce a multitude of 
truths for our reason to consider. 
We may reside in the valley of separation, constantly required to evaluate with our reason 
the streams of truth around us, but that does not mean there must always be a separation between 
Reality and us. Myth is there—all we need to do is follow the streams up and receive the view 
from the mountain through our imaginations. Starr, in his article on the meaning of meaning in 
Lewis’s work, states that “There is, therefore, no place along the stream pouring from the 
mountain down into the valley where one may stop and say, ‘Here is truth but there is myth.’ The 
separation no longer exists. Experiencing and thinking simply become knowing.” (167-8). We 
will see the same things there that we do down here, but in a different way: the natural will be 
contained in the higher. Lewis gives an example in his review of Tolkien’s The Lord of the 
Rings: “In the book Eomer rashly contrasts ‘the green earth’ with ‘legends’. Aragorn replies that 
the green earth itself is ‘a mighty matter of legend’” (OTOW 120). 
 Often, however, we do not experience the myth, we lower it into the valley and search for 
the truths within it instead—this becomes an intellectual exercise and the name for it is 
“allegory” (GID 66). In Lewis’s work, allegory is very different than myth: allegory contains 
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specific correlations where this object points to that concept. Myth, however, cannot be broken 
into parts—the meaning exists in the whole (CL II 438).26 In a letter to Father Peter Milward, 
Lewis notes that the myth ends up with many meanings that vary according to differing readers; 
the allegory has one set meaning, put into it specifically by the writer (CL III 789).27 Lewis 
concludes by saying, “Into an allegory a man can put only what he already knows: in a myth he 
puts what he does not yet know and cd. not come to know in any other way” (CL III 789-790). 
Myth is beyond the domain of reason, able to reach into the unknown darkness. Since it is so 
complex (yet so simple in structure) and dense with meaning, myth can become the “master key” 
to open up doors within each individual reader’s world (OTOW 115).  
Yet, the division between allegory and myth is not so easy to pinpoint at times. Lewis felt 
that “when allegory is at its best, it approaches myth” and like myth, needs the faculty of the 
imagination for reception (PR 11-12). Lewis had hope that his own allegory, The Pilgrim’s 
Regress, would also contain “some touch of mythical life” and would go beyond direct 
explanation (PR 12). Lewis is also concerned about the mind of the reader, fascinated with why 
some readers gain insight or enjoyment from a text, and others do not. In his essay “On Stories,” 
Lewis posits a division not only between texts (the stories that can give enjoyment and those that 
cannot) but also between readers (OTOW 26). For Lewis, the “same story may be mythical or 
symbolical to one person and allegorical to another” (CL II 438).28 A person’s reception of myth 
thus varies as to the cast of mind that is brought to the myth. The children can glimpse the tree 
myth because the image is new and all they have is their imaginations to use. Is it possible for the 
grown-ups to see back into Eden, with their minds already filled with an abstracted outline of a 
                                                
26 Aug 18, 1940. 
27 Sept 22, 1956. 
28 This quote comes from a letter to Eliza Marian Bulter, Aug 18, 1940. She was interested in Lewis’s ideas about 
symbolism from his book The Allegory of Love. 
   
 21 
tree? They know only the allegory, filled with the tree as fact; they cannot see the tree as myth. 
This brings us back to the original dilemma: how can those stuck in reason move into 
imagination and beyond into a fusion of both? What if they cannot receive the myth as a myth 
and are unable to begin crossing the bridge while others sense its presence and walk boldly 
across? 
What does it take? Lewis suggests a shift to valuing the imagination, for “myth must be 
grasped with the imagination not with the intellect” (PR 12). One must set the intellect aside, at 
least for a time, and search for meaning that is more “intuitive” rather than truth gained through 
deduction (Starr 171). The idea of reception is key: “It is only while receiving the myth as a story 
that you experience the principle concretely” (GID 66). The emotions that are aroused by myth 
result from this “prior act of attending to or looking towards something” (EC 264). One must 
dare to stand within the sunbeam and “look along,” to get involved and let the whole person be 
affected. In the realm of Scripture, as with any text filled with “poetic” language, instead of the 
“theological” or “scientific,” this openness is essential. In one essay, Lewis insists that if 
“religious sayings . . . should happen to contain information about real things, you will not get it 
on any other terms”—one must “meet them with a certain good will, a certain readiness to find 
meaning” (EC 266). This applies to any text with a mythical element. The person, who insists on 
abstracted facts alone, will remain in what they already know, for the imaginative meaning 
cannot be attained through the reason. Lewis’s response to the Russians, who claimed that they 
could not find God in space, equally applies to myth: “What is required is a certain faculty of 
recognition” (EC 62). Reception of myth requires both attention and openness—the 
characteristics of an active imagination willing to move, to change, and to be changed.   
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The teachers believe in trees, they hold in their memory their form and structure, they 
have settled that in their intellects and asserted to the past reality of trees. Is this, like all other 
beliefs, hostile to the imagination? Lewis qualifies his earlier statement on belief and the 
imagination and suggests that this is not always the case. Once reason accepts a belief, a different 
sort of “aesthetic satisfaction” can result—“there is a dignity and poignancy in the bare fact that 
a thing exists” (WG 121). Beliefs can become “poetries” to those who believe in them, and 
produce a deeper enjoyment that is the result, not the cause of their belief (WG 122). In fact, 
Lewis asserts that “all worldviews yield poetry to those who believe them,” holding a meaning 
that is lost on those outside. In the case of Christianity, Lewis says that the Gospels remain 
elusive to all those who attempt to systematize them within the intellect; the Gospels demand 
more, a response from the “whole man” (RP 113). Myth, functions as a “door into the human 
heart,” and goes where “analytic rationalism” cannot because myth does not attempt to “ignore 
the transcendent, as if it did not exist” (Hein 18). For Lewis, myth and imagination must be part 
of belief, even Christian belief. It simply is not possible to have “direct ‘knowledge about’ 
(savoir) the ultimate Being” (FL 115). At times, however, we can by “Grace” have “some 
‘knowledge-by-acquaintance’ (connaître), some ‘tasting’ of Love Himself” (FL 115). We see 
through the imagination, and come to knowledge through analogy and symbol. Even in religion 
(and perhaps more so than in any other place), myth operates, allowing the reason to briefly 
transcend its limitations and accept the experience of the imagination. 
This chapter must end however, with a limiting factor, remembering that Lewis called 
myth only a “partial solution” (GID 66). Lewis believes that something else transcends myth, 
something more powerful and longer lasting. Myth may carry and reflect Reality, but it is not 
Reality itself. The “something else” that myth gives us a glimpse of, that thing we long to find 
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and enjoy, still recedes. Myth allows for experience, for the imagination to actively live 
concretely for a brief time, but we cannot remain there—our predicament continues. We are still 
confined to time and history, bound by the succession of moments that we live within. Myth is 
removed from this, alone and pure on its mountaintop, undisturbed by the rushing and mingling 
streams below. We will get to Lewis’s provisional solution later, but for now, we need to 
consider Lewis’s specific views on myth in regards to pagan mythology and the Incarnation.  
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Chapter 2: Lewis’s Mythic Focus 
Pagan Mythology 
 
As a boy, Lewis was haunted and moved by mythology—the vast “northernness” of the Norse 
sagas, their “remoteness, severity,” washed over him with a renewal of the joy he had first met in 
childhood (SBJ 62). Lewis would later call the discovery of these tales an “imaginative 
Renaissance”—he found that the thing, the joy he desired, came through mythology (SBJ 65). In 
a letter to Owen Barfield, during their “Great War” exchange of letters, Lewis sets down his 
definition of mythology:  
A myth is a description or a story introducing supernatural personages or things, 
determined not, or not only, by motives arising from events within the story, but by the 
supposedly immutable relations of the personages or things: possessing unity: and not, 
save accidentally, connected with any given place or time. (CL III 1619)29 
His definition notes that myth requires the presence of the supernatural, an internal unity within 
the myth itself, and the importance of a separation from the particular and local, thereby setting 
myth into another time and place outside of history. A few years later, in the conversation with 
J.R.R. Tolkien and Hugo Dyson, Lewis protests their belief that myth can be contained in a true 
story, “myths are lies,” he says, “even though lies breathed through silver” (Carpenter 147). 
Though he loved and revered the great myths, at this time Lewis lived deep in the belief that they 
were false and thus removed from any rational and historical account of reality.  
                                                
29 This letter is numbered four in Series 1 of the “Great War” letters and was possibly written in 1927 (There is no 
date attached to it in the Collected Letters). A similar definition is quoted in Walter Hooper, Past Watchful Dragons 
from a notebook of Lewis’s (286): “A Myth is the description of a state, an event, or a series of events, involving a 
particular time or place, and dependent for its contents not on motives developed in the course of action but on the 
immutable relations of the personages” (MS 15, fol. 138). 
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 In a 1946 essay titled “Religion without Dogma,” Lewis outlines the various options for 
the origins of mythology (GID 131).30 Some individuals, he remarks, count mythology as 
“literally true” (GID 131). Mircea Eliade’s later definition fits here: where myth is the narration 
of a “sacred history” that took place in illo tempore, a “true history of what came to pass at the 
beginning of Time” (Myths 23).31 Other views include myth as allegorical truth, “as confused 
history,” “as priestly lies,” or Frazer’s “agricultural ritual” that gets “mistaken for propositions” 
(GID 131-2).32 Most of these options (aside from the first one) contain some element of 
falsehood, although individuals within their respective religion and rituals may believe their 
personal myths are true. In this essay, Lewis is not restricting his own definition to any single 
one of these options. He adds the supernatural to this list, considering both the divine and the 
diabolical as possible origins of mythology. For Lewis, mythology is a human system, informed 
and guided by the supernatural, and as such, has a mixture of sources, including “true history, 
allegory, ritual, [and] the human delight in story telling” (GID 132).  
 In Lewis’s fictional world of Perelandra, Ransom sees Mars and Venus and immediately 
connects them with the mythological Ares and Aphrodite. He is puzzled—since earth “has been 
besieged” and occupied by an evil enemy, how did humans learn of and copy the true 
supernatural beings that he is now meeting (Pere 201)? Ransom discovers that “traces of the 
celestial commonwealth are not quite lost,” and some memory of “Deep heaven” survives even 
on earth (Pere 201). What was once thought to be false must be “based on a solider reality than 
we dream,” he concludes (Pere 201). The “solider reality” Ransom is meeting is the Perfect 
                                                
30 A similar list in included in Miracles, published in 1947—the paper “Religion without Dogma” was read to the 
Socratic Club on May 20, 1946 (GID 14). 
31 Eliade’s book comes after most of Lewis’s work on myths, in 1960. Mircea Eliade. Myths, Dreams and Mysteries: 
The Encounter between Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Realities. Tran. Philip Mairet. New York and Evanston: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1960. Print.  
32 Anthropologist Sir James George Frazer first published The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion in 
1890. Lewis mentions reading it in is diary on January 4, 1923 (AMR 170). 
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Form beyond all earthly mythological stories. It is confused now, a mixing of “celestial strength 
and beauty” with human, impure elements. According to Lewis mythology “at its best” is “a real 
though unfocused gleam of divine truth falling on human imagination” (M 218). Myth may be 
“fact” in some other place (Pere 102). In Lewis’s short story, “Forms of Things Unknown,” he 
places Medusa on the moon. While existing only in ancient mythology on earth, she is alive and 
deadly on the moon; Medusa is a Fact there (DT 119-128). Perhaps, says Lewis, the things in 
myth that may be “scattered through other worlds as realities” (Pere 45), could also be greater 
Realities in an eternal, heavenly realm. In a letter to Mary Neylan, he considers the connection 
between time and eternity: 
After all, if there is an eternal world and if our world is its manifestation, then you would 
expect bits of it to ‘stick through’ into ours. We are like children pulling the levers of a 
vast machine of which most is concealed. We see a few little wheels that buzz round on 
this side when we start it up—but what glorious or frightful processes we are initiating in 
there, we don’t know. (CL II 394)33 
What might eternal things look like when they “stick through” and would we be able to 
recognize them when they do? Could mythology aid the imagination in some way, making it 
more sensitive to otherworldly Reality? 
 In The Pilgrim’s Regress, the things that “stick through” are called “pictures” that 
produce desire in the inhabitants of Pagus (172). John learns from History, that the picture is not 
always the same; sometimes it is an image of a superhuman race, other times the picture tells a 
story, or looks like a beautiful woman (PR 172-3). Every picture is a message that can lead a 
pagan to “where true joys are to be found” (PR 172). Those who study the picture carefully also 
turn and see within the real, human world something “hiding, yet not quite hidden, like 
                                                
33 April 18, 1940. 
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something even more about to be” (PR 174). The hidden secret is the presence of a different 
Reality within the reality of Nature. Lewis himself learns that the desire the pictures awakened 
leads beyond them, to an “Object . . . further away, more external, less subjective, than even such 
a comparatively public and external thing as a system of mythology” (SBJ 136-7). For those who 
look long enough, myth is simply the carrier or the reflector of the “Thing” hidden behind. In the 
land of Pagus many messages were sent, but all were connected, the newer simply bringing the 
older into a “fuller light” (PR 175).  
 Though mythology is distorted in human hands, Lewis believes that it holds bits of Truth, 
a “divine hinting in poetic and ritual form,” pictures sent by a benevolent Landlord as a 
“praeparatio evangelica” (GID 132).34 There seems to be something significant “in that 
persistent motif of blood, death, and resurrection, which runs like a black and scarlet cord 
through all the greater myths,” writes Lewis to his friend Arthur (CL II 35).35 Lewis begins to 
view pagan mythology as the “first shadowy approach” (CL II 35), the “good dreams” sent by a 
                                                
34 A note needs to be made here to clarify the term “truth” somewhat similar to the digression about “reality” and 
“fact” in chapter one. Lewis again seems to use the term on two levels, sometimes in a heavenly sense, other times 
strictly confined to earth. In Perelandra, Ransom realizes that the “triple distinction of truth from myth and of both 
from fact was purely terrestrial” (143-4). There is a place where truth, myth, and fact are all equivalent—Lewis calls 
it heaven. Truth is still present on earth, but it is separated from myth and fact. “Fact,” in Lewis’s terms refers to the 
plane of reality, the concrete part in Nature. Truth, on earth, is abstracted from myth and fact, and thus one step 
removed from reality. In the essay “Myth Became Fact,” myth is connected with reality, but not directly with truth: 
“What flows into you from the myth is not truth but reality (truth is always about something, but reality is that about 
which truth is), and therefore, every myth becomes the father of innumerable truths on the abstract level. Myth is the 
mountain whence all the different streams arise which become truths down in the valley” (GID 66). A person 
experiences reality through the myth, and then stands back and uses the reason to abstract truths from the mythic 
experience. In the essay “Bluspels and Flalansferes,” Lewis calls the reason “the natural organ of truth,” distancing 
truth from the imagination which deals instead with meaning (R 157). Meaning, then, is “the antecedent condition 
both of truth and falsehood” (R 157). On earth, the reason separates true and false statements, forming opinions 
about what resides in the “organ of meaning.” The intellectual ghost in The Great Divorce is told that he had 
“experienced truth only with the abstract intellect” while on earth (40). When bound by time, the only way to 
approach truth is in the innumerable streams in the valley, abstracted from myth and reality. In heaven, the ghost is 
given the chance to “taste [truth] like honey and be embraced by it as by a bridegroom” (GD 40). In heaven, Truth is 
a Person, the One Lewis names as God, and thus is the Divine Myth, and the Eternal Fact as well. This is why 
Ransom can say that there is no distinction between them. Truth resides in the plural on earth, fragmented and 
separated from its source, like a dream vision separated from real life. The pattern beyond is “so large” that the 
pieces on earth that do not seem to fit together (like myth and truth) are perfectly connected there (Pere 147). 
35 January 10, 1932. 
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kind supernatural Being (MC 54), the “mere beginnings—the first faint whisper of the wind from 
beyond the world” (TST 430).36 In Lewis’s allegory, John comes through the mountain, “dying 
many deaths,” and learning many things—but he is confused about Wisdom’s words on 
mythology (PR 190). A voice behind him, however, says that “it is My mythology,” calling it 
“an image, not the very real” (PR 190).37 Mythology is a “veil” that hides the face of another and 
is used specifically for that purpose. Whoever this voice belongs to, he is the “thing itself,” the 
Reality behind the veil. This voice suggests there may be a real god who dies and resurrects, the 
idea hidden behind similar pictures within the earthly mythologies. The voice continues: “For 
this end I made your senses and for this end your imagination, that you might see My face and 
live” (PR 190). John, suddenly immersed in mythology and learning to see with his imagination, 
is experiencing the Real behind the veil of earthly myth. Strangely, during this whole 
imaginative experience, John does not leave the character “Reason behind” but finds that she is 
more present than before (PR 191). Who or What has John found in mythology that is able to 
somehow reconcile both reason and imagination? 
                                                
36 Letter to Arthur Greeves, November 8, 1931. 
37 See Peter Schakel’s book Reason and Imagination for a discussion on this passage, specifically in regards to myth 
as an “image” and not “fact” (123-5). Schakel finds that this passage does not fit with the ideas in the essay “Myth 
Became Fact.” In The Pilgrim’s Regress the Divine voice says that “mythology” belongs to Him, it is “truth” and 
“image” not “fact” or “real.” In “Myth Became Fact,” myth allows an experience of “reality” not “truth.” Schakel 
explains that Lewis has just shifted his thinking about myth in the time between The Pilgrim’s Regress and the later 
essay (Reason 123). He notes that Lewis changed his thinking on the concept of truth: in the earlier text, the 
emphasis is on mythologies containing truth from God (they are not complete lies, in other words); in the later essay, 
Lewis is combating the focus on “abstract truths” (Reason 124). However, another possibility (and one that might 
make Schakel’s argument clearer), is to consider the dualistic definitions for these terms—there is earthly reality and 
truth, and there is heavenly Reality and Truth. There does not need to be any shift in Lewis’s thinking to make the 
two texts work together. The passage in The Pilgrim’s Regress is discussing earthly systems of mythology (later in 
the passage the Divine voice mentions the “story of Semele” and corn and wine as images of the dying and living 
God in pagan lands). Earthly mythologies are images, containing earthly truths (that connect with a Divine Reality, 
but are abstracted from that Reality); they are not the Divine Myth. In the later essay, Lewis is discussing the Divine 
Myth, the actual dying and living God, who comes to earth through the Incarnation. Experience of the heavenly 
Myth allows Reality to flow into the imagination, but experience of earthly mythologies allows only an image of the 
real, and thus only earthly truths to flow into the mind. Thus Schakel’s summary—“Myth, therefore, remains 
limited: it is a veil, something one must ultimately get past if one is to experience reality”—needs to be qualified 
(Reason 125). A difference between Divine and earthly myth needs to be specified. Based on the position of this 
paper a re-wording like this would make things clearer: Earthly mythologies remain limited: they are veils, 
something one must ultimately get past if one is to experience Divine Reality and Divine Myth. 
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 Lewis later writes in Surprised by Joy that he began to ask where religion reaches “its 
true maturity?” and where “have the hints of Paganism been fulfilled?” (188). He describes 
Paganism in this passage as the “childhood of religion,” an early “prophetic dream” (SBJ 188). If 
there is falsehood in pagan mythology, it is the falseness of a “garbled version” of historical fact 
that “lives in popular report” (RP 107). It is the falseness of the trees the children imagined 
compared with the Real trees—those original trees back in Eden. For Lewis, the “divine hinting” 
pointed to “Christianity as the completion, the actualization, the entelechy, of something that had 
never been wholly absent from the mind of man” (GID 132). In a letter to Arthur Greeves, Lewis 
calls “Christianity the thing itself” (TST 430).38 All these “pictures” and “hints” within the 
mythologies concerning a dying and resurrecting god came to fulfillment in the Incarnation. 
Lewis cites two ways of looking at mythology: either pagan mythology is a devilish 
“counterfeit” and rightly holds the label of “lies” or mythology has divine elements (and thus 
contains Truth) that points to and prepares individuals for Christ (RP 106). Lewis, because of 
that conversation with Tolkien and Dyson, begins to believe the second option. The importance 
of sacrifice in both pagan mythologies and Christianity becomes the key for Lewis’s 
understanding of myth. The theme of sacrifice, hinted at in the best earthly mythologies, comes 
to fruition at the Incarnation, suffering, and resurrection of Christ. 
The Turn: Myth + Fact 
 
Lewis suggests that there once was a time (perhaps in Eden) when men did not need mythology, 
hints, and dreams—man’s original abilities to see have been lost. In the poem, “The Country of 
the Blind” (Poems 33-4) Lewis imagines a nation of eyeless men, blind now from their own 
                                                
38 November 8, 1931. 
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desire for safety against the “guns of heav’n” (l. 8).39 In their darkness, they think little of the 
words used in the past, “talking of light in some / Eunuch’d etiolated, / Fungoid sense, as a 
symbol of / Abstract thoughts” (l. 10-13). They are like the individuals that Lewis confronts in 
the essay “Bluspels and Flalansferes,” creating a “semantic nightmare” by their belief that 
language can be pure, literal, and without the complication of metaphor (R 133-158). What if 
someone with eyes came along, Lewis wonders, and described the actual things he saw? The 
blind men would still have words like see and dark, but they would now be used in a figurative 
sense, where see means to “understand,” and dark may mean “difficult” (EC 265). The words 
would be robbed of their density of meaning, abstracted from their original reality. The man 
would be laughed at and told he is only “concocting a myth, taking the words for things,” or that 
he may be expressing emotion, not reality (l. 26). Which of the two is actually seeing the real—
the blind men with their precise terms or the man who seems to speak in myth? What if what we 
now call myth is closer to the Truth? The poem ends with Lewis’s belief that things were not 
always this way; men dare to speak on truths that were once “Opaque, carved in divine forms, 
irremovable, / Dread but dear as a mountain— / Mass, stood plain to the inward eye” (l. 30-32). 
 According to Lewis, there was a time when words meant more, when humans could see 
the real/Real when they used the words for their secondary meanings: to understand really meant 
to see reality/Reality. Lewis places the separation between the reason and the imagination at the 
Fall of man and his exile from Eden. While Ransom experiences myth as fact on the planet 
Perelandra, he realizes “that the triple distinction of truth from myth and of both from fact was 
purely terrestrial—was part and parcel of that unhappy division between soul and body which 
resulted from the Fall” (Pere 143-4). Marjorie Wright, in her dissertation examining kingdoms of 
                                                
39 This poem was originally published in Punch CCXXI (Sept 1951), p 303. Lewis wrote a prose equivalent to this 
poem in the essay titled “The Language of Religion” (EC 265-6). 
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myth, comments on this idea of Lewis’s: the “myth-history distinction is an arbitrary one based 
on the presence of evil and the fall of man, a result of separations in the universe never meant to 
exist” (Cosmic 142). Some may equate myth with falsehood now, but perhaps it was not always 
so. The trees were real in Eden, and even now, some still have eyes to see them. Is it possible, 
however, for the blind—those stuck in the reason’s abstracted language—to see again? 
Hidden within pagan mythology is the idea of a dying god, an idea that Lewis positions 
within the “heaven of legend and imagination” (GID 66) and that speaks directly to the “savage, 
child, poet” within everyone, and perhaps also to the blind (GID 67). There is hope that the 
dilemma is not our final state, that somehow reason and imagination can be united again. 
Ransom muses, “Even on earth the sacraments existed as a permanent reminder that the division 
was neither wholesome nor final” (Pere 144). What was hidden within pagan mythology comes 
to light in Christianity. The dying god myth needed to enter into the realm of history, reality, and 
fact. Ransom concludes that the “beginning of its disappearance,” this soul-inhibiting division 
between myth and truth on earth, occurred at the “Incarnation” (Pere 144). Suddenly, what was 
once only an idea, a mythological dream on earth, comes to actually happen—the dying god idea 
becomes fact. Lewis insists that the particularity of the Incarnation, its time and space specificity, 
is what makes Christianity the fulfillment of pagan mythology. The event, the dying god, occurs 
in the “earth of history” and triggers measurable historical consequences (GID 66). In a letter to 
Warfield Firor, Lewis outlines his view: “The Incarnation. He is a Jew. Our Lord, besides being 
the divine Thou is also a historical character, who must be considered as He. Indeed this is the 
essence of our faith. ‘Crucified under Pontius Pilate’—date, & signature of a civil servant & all, 
crude, historical event.” (CL III 631).40 For Lewis, “The Christian story is about a historical 
                                                
40 July 11, 1955.  
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personage,” whose death and resurrection becomes the cornerstone for the whole history of the 
church (WG 128-9).  
 Based on Lewis’s conception of pagan mythology, the event of the Incarnation comes as 
no surprise for him. It is like “something coming gradually into focus” the slow progress within 
heathen religions of a “vague and mythical” idea, “a god who is killed and broken and then 
comes to life again” (EC 324-5). The dying god of myth is “not historical”—there is no 
specificity of place and time (EC 325). The Old Testament begins to distill these ideas into a 
religious system, “connected with a particular nation” (EC 325). Finally, “in the New Testament 
the thing really happens. The dying god really appears—as a historical Person, living in a 
definite place and time” (EC 325). In his essay titled “Is Theology Poetry?” Lewis repeats these 
ideas, situating the pagan myths with their yearly dying and rising of gods as a precursor to the 
“real event”: “It is not the difference between falsehood and truth . . . It is like watching 
something come gradually into focus; first it hangs in the clouds of myth and ritual, vast and 
vague, then it condenses, grows hard and in a sense small, as a historical event in first century 
Palestine” (WG 129). A few years after this passage was written, in his book Miracles, Lewis 
attempts to meet the objection that Christ is “simply another corn-king,” the Gospels as a story 
that conveniently makes use of a previous theme popular in the yearly cycles of pagan ritual (M 
181). According to Lewis, the Gospels conspicuously lack the sort of imagery and analogies that 
traditionally go along with the pagan stories—the Gospels present the central event of the 
“Nature-religions” but within a culture “where no trace of Nature-religion was present” (M 
183).41 Lewis decides it must be the other way around, that the dying god event in the Gospels is 
not derivative of the corn-king pattern. Instead, he considers Christ the original Corn-King, the 
                                                
41 Lewis notes here that the imagery of the dying seed dying that produces new life is only mentioned twice in the 
Gospels. He expected more of this type of analogy since the central theme of the Gospels is the life and death of 
Christ (M 182).  
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Reality behind, which the human imagination vaguely saw through “the facts of Nature” (M 
186). The mythology is an image of, but is not the “Thing itself.” Christ is what all “religious 
history . . . anticipates,” the “Origin” of everything else (RP 27). 
 This is what Lewis means when he says that Myth has become fact. The Real Myth 
became a historical fact; “The essential meaning of all things came down from the ‘heaven’ of 
myth to the ‘earth’ of history” (WG 129-30). What is Reality in an otherworldly sense (what we 
term Myth) became reality in a physical sense; what once was only intuited through the 
imagination came to be known through the senses of those present in first century Palestine. 
Lewis considers the Hebrews, like all other nations, the holders of a mythology, except that in 
this case, this was a particular “mythology chosen by God to be the vehicle of the earliest sacred 
truths” that only became “incarnate as History” in the New Testament (M 218). This mixing of 
Myth and fact is the origin of the character of the Gospel texts. Lewis, as a literary critic well 
versed in mythologies, found that the Gospels “had not the mythical taste,” and were written in 
an “artless, historical fashion” (SBJ 188). Yet, their very subject matter was the theme of the 
“great myths” (SBJ 188). In “Fern-Seed and Elephants,” Lewis concludes that there are two 
possible ways of approaching the Gospels: “Either this is reportage—though it may no doubt 
contain errors—pretty close up to the facts; nearly as close as Boswell. Or else, some unknown 
writer in the second century anticipated the whole technique of modern, novelistic, realistic 
narrative. If it is untrue, it must be narrative of that kind” (EC 244-5).42 The narrative of the 
Gospels, this story of the beginning of the Christian community, holds within it the strange 
theme of the dying and resurrecting god of pagan mythology. What Lewis calls either a 
journalist-type text or a “novelistic, realistic narrative,” becomes the vehicle for divine Myth.  
                                                
42 This essay is titled “Fern-Seed and Elephants” in the book Essay Collection: Faith, Christianity and the Church, 
but was originally titled “Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism.” It was read at Westcott House, Cambridge on 
May 11, 1959. 
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 Lewis has little interest in demythologizing the Gospels; he prefers the presence of the 
miraculous within a narrative, within a historical-sounding text.43 The “Grand Miracle,” 
according to Lewis, not only includes the fact that Christ incarnated into history, died, and rose 
again, but also that He did not lose any of his Mythical Reality—God became man but remained 
God. The Myth was not discarded in favour of history. When viewed from an earthly position 
this becomes a set of paradoxes. The heavenly Myth, once “glimpsed in dream and symbol and 
the acted poetry of ritual becomes small, solid—no bigger than a man” (WG 130). There is the 
very real sense of “humiliation” as the Myth became fact (WG 130). Somehow, in this paradox 
of space, the greatness of what is Beyond merges into the present reality on earth, yet “leads to a 
greater glory,” or what Lewis calls a “still deeper poetry” (WG 130). Lewis also considers the 
paradox of time, how the Myth, residing in eternity, could take up the guise of time without 
discarding the Eternal Reality. Lewis resolves this (inadequate though any such resolutions may 
be) by calling the Incarnation an eternal event, not “an episode in the life of God” (EC 46).44 He 
continues, “The taking up into God’s nature of humanity, with all its ignorances and limitations, 
is not itself a temporal event, though the humanity which is so taken up was, like our own, a 
thing living and dying in time” (EC 46). What became earthly fact for a time is itself an eternal 
Fact. For Lewis, the Incarnation is an eternal Reality—in heaven, it is both Myth and Fact, and 
when Christ invaded time, Myth became earthly reality and fulfilled the earthly myth already 
                                                
43 Mark Freshwater has a chapter in C. S. Lewis and the Truth of Myth detailing Lewis’s relationship to New 
Testament scholarship, specifically in regards to the search for the “historical Jesus” (55-82). These scholars 
attempted to demythologize Christ by removing the miracles from the Gospel texts, and thus uncover the “real” man 
and place the Gospels onto a more rational, objective footing. Freshwater says, “Lewis felt he had to reject their 
findings or reject what gave Christianity its mythic power. Lewis sensed a numinous presence in, with, and under 
the objective data that many New Testament scholars seemed to miss” (62). 
44 The centrality and eternality of the Incarnation is an important concept in A.M. Allchin’s book Participation in 
God: A Forgotten Strand in Anglican Tradition. He does not specifically place Lewis directly in this tradition, but 
does quote from Lewis’s Oxford History of English Literature in his section on Richard Hooker. A short line in the 
section “The Co-inherence of Human and Divine” fits directly with Lewis’s ideas here: Allchin is outlining the 
theology of Maximus the Confessor, in regards to the Incarnation, “’the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us’. 
But that is not an isolated incident. It is the focal point of all creation” (Participation 71). 
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existing in time. The separating line between Myth and fact is finally erased on earth. In the 
words of Ransom, “The Incarnation” is the “beginning of its disappearance,” and man’s dilemma 
is given a solution. 
In Lewis’s theology, myth/Myth cannot be escaped. The core of Christianity, the very 
part that is often attacked, is the mythical element; the “heart of Christianity is a myth which is 
also a fact” (GID 65, 66). The dying god theme becomes, for Lewis, the one “vital and 
nourishing element” (GID 64), the part of Christianity that “gives life” (GID 65). If one was to 
remove “all explanations and reinterpretations” from the Christian Creed, what would be left, 
says Lewis, is “something quite unambiguously supernatural, miraculous, and shocking” (GID 
69). Alison Searle, in her article titled “Narrative, Metaphor, and Myth in C. S. Lewis’s 
Testimonial Novel Till We Have Faces,” outlines the importance of myth for those within the 
Christian worldview: “the hope to which joy entices, and the appetite which myth whets, is 
underwritten by a divine mythology, penetrating history, and assuring that while ‘now we see in 
a mirror dimly,’ we will then see ‘face to face’ (1 Corinthians 13:12)” (231).45 Lewis is not 
interested in removing Myth or miracle from the Gospels, attempting to fit them into the 
container of historical veracity alone and appease the reason’s insistence on proofs and 
definitions. A place must be left for mystery and for the exercising of the imagination within the 
life of Christianity. If Christ fused Myth and fact and fulfilled earthly myth with heavenly Fact, 
then some room must be left for the “larger pattern” beyond the frame of our limited earthly 
existence (Pere 148). Near the end of his life, Lewis, in a letter, reminds us again that we are not 
to reduce everything to rational definition: “I think the ideas of sacrifice, Ransom, Championship 
(over Death), Substitution etc. are all images to suggest the reality (not otherwise 
                                                
45 Alison Searle. "Narrative, Metaphor and Myth in C. S. Lewis's Testimonial Novel Till We Have Faces." Oral and 
Written Narratives and Cultural Identity: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Eds. Francisco C. Fagundes and Irene M. 
Blayer. New York: Peter Lang P, 2007. 225-244. Print.  
   
 36 
comprehensible to us) of the Atonement. To fix on any one of them as if it contained and limited 
the truth like a scientific definition wd. in my opinion be a mistake” (CL III 1476).46 All 
doctrines abstracted from the Myth are “less true” than the Myth itself; for Lewis “they are 
translations into our concepts and ideas of that which God has already expressed in a language 
more adequate, namely the actual incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection” (TST 428). 
Christianity must not ignore the imagination, for reception and belief cannot occur without the 
use of both faculties. Individuals not only must assent to the historical fact with the reason, but 
also must experience the Incarnation as Myth with an “imaginative embrace” (GID 67). Myth 
must have a place within Christianity—Lewis has hope that the few who still have eyes and sight 
may be listened to after all, that the “divine forms” may again loom large as a “mountain - / 
Mass” within our diminished language systems. 
  
                                                
46 Letter to Mr Young, October 31, 1963; Lewis passed away November 22, 1963. 
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Chapter 3: The Dilemma of Elusive Mythic Tasting 
Story: Human Narrative as a Vessel for Divine Myth 
 
If we are going to embrace the metaphorical richness of language (and avoid the country of the 
blind), and if we are seeking a glimpse of “tree-delighted Eden,” then Myth is a key component 
in the solution to our dilemma. The imagination must be embraced alongside the reason; Myth 
must be united with fact. Myth, however, recedes from view, slipping beyond the realm of 
words; it is only a partial solution. Some net needs to be cast to hold Myth long enough for the 
imagination to experience its concreteness. Lewis calls this net Story, a model he details in his 
essay “On Stories”47 and in the chapter titled “On Myth” in the book An Experiment in Criticism. 
Before we can approach Lewis’s narrative in Till We Have Faces, the concept of Story must be 
examined. 
 Story, according to Lewis, is a “series of imagined events” (OTOW 25), “a form where 
the means are apparently so often at war with the end” (OTOW 44). The “means” is the plot, the 
events that happen, or in Paul Ricoeur’s terminology, the “episodic dimension” that forms the 
underlying structure of the text (“Narrative Time” 174). The “end” is what Lewis calls the 
theme—the “configurational” or “non-chronological” dimension in Ricoeur’s conception of 
narrative (174).48 The connection and tension between these two components are foundational 
for Lewis’s notion of Story. Lewis, however, laments that literary critics rarely examine the story 
itself, focusing instead on things like character development or on the story as a social critique 
(OTOW 25). In a letter to Dorothy Sayers, Lewis mentions Aristotle and Maud Bodkin as the 
                                                
47 “On Stories” was originally published in Essays Presented to Charles Williams, 1947. 
48 Mara Donaldson makes use of Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative to extend Lewis’s theory of story in her 
discussion of Till We Have Faces in the article “Orual’s Story and the Art of Retelling: A Study of Till We Have 
Faces.” 
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only ones who discuss “the nature of story” (CL II 655).49 In the essay “On Stories,” Lewis again 
mentions Aristotle, but adds Boccaccio and the “allegorical theory of story” of the Middle Ages, 
as well as Jung and his theory of archetypes (OTOW 25).  
 Lewis is interested in a specific kind of story, a story where all the elements exist “for the 
sake of the story itself,” and which is read merely for the “pleasure” of the story (OTOW 25, 26). 
Such a text, however, is not easy to label, and Lewis struggles with terminology. In the essay 
“On Stories,” he simply calls narratives that give pleasure Story; in the chapter “On Myth,” he 
details his frustration of terms but settles on myth. The difficulty arises because we already use 
the terms story and myth in many other ways. In “On Myth,” Lewis takes the reader back to the 
original Greek word, mythos, which means simply “story”—an umbrella-like term to cover any 
sort of tale (true or false), anything with a plot (EIC 42). He recognizes that the accumulated 
ideas about the term myth make any such discussion complicated, but Lewis decides there is 
nothing better for the idea he wishes to present. He qualifies this by adding that of the stories 
traditionally labeled “myth,” only the best convey the feature he is seeking (EIC 42).50 He also 
adds that other stories invented later, “in fully civilized periods,” can have a mythical quality.51 
For the purposes of this paper, the term Story will be used to distinguish it from Lewis’s other 
uses of the word myth (like Divine Myth and pagan mythology). 
 Lewis is searching for a particular kind of story, one with a “very simple narrative 
shape—a satisfactory and inevitable shape, like a good vase or a tulip,” where a synopsis of the 
                                                
49 Letter written on May 25, 1945. Maud Bodkin’s book, Archetypal Patterns in Poetry: Psychological Studies of 
Imagination (1934), is an effort to test the hypothesis of Jung that certain poems contain “a significance going 
beyond the definite meaning conveyed” through the use of “archetypes” that work below the readers “conscious 
response” (1). 
50 Lewis lists “Orpheus, Demeter and Persephone, the Hesperides, Balder, Ragnarok, or Ilmarinen’s forging of the 
Sampo” as traditional myths that convey the quality he is seeking (EIC 42). 
51 The later mythic stories Lewis mentions are Dr. Jekyll and Mr Hyde (Robert Louis Stevenson), The Door in the 
Wall (H.G. Wells), The Castle (Kafka), the Gormenghast in Titus Groan (Mervyn Peake), and the Ents and 
Lothlorien in Lord of the Rings (J.R.R. Tolkien) (EIC 42-3). 
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account is as powerful as the story itself (EIC 42). Wright, in her dissertation “The Cosmic 
Kingdom of Myth,” refers to this as the “simple structural line” found in a mythic text, where 
“Each object and each event stands out in its own definite shape and entity” (41). What 
complicates any labeling, however, is Lewis’s admission that this is not only a division of 
stories; it is also dependent on the degree of receptivity in the reader (OTOW 26). The same story 
may have a mythic effect on one reader and not on another (EIC 45-6). Lewis laments in the 
essay, “On Science Fiction,” that no one, not even Jung, has been able to satisfactorily explain 
the source of pleasure in Story (OTOW 94). Lewis commends Jung for his attempt but notes that 
Jung’s explanation of Story is a new myth that “affects us in the same way as the rest” (OTOW 
94). Lewis is looking for a rational analysis of Story, rather than a new myth, metaphor, or 
imaginative construct. Perhaps it is not possible. In the earlier version of “On Stories,” Lewis 
calls the key element of Story the “kappa element,” the thing that is hidden in the text (Ward 
15).52 “Kappa” refers to the “initial letter of the Greek word κρυπτóν, meaning ‘hidden’ or 
‘cryptic’” (Ward 15).53 In “On Stories,” Lewis notes that the Story provides “something else,” an 
atmosphere or quality that can only be received by the imagination, something that usually 
resides in myth. In the essay “On Science Fiction,” Lewis does not even begin an analysis, 
saying, “I shall not attempt to do what Jung failed to do” (OTOW 94). The chapter “On Myth,” 
written later, focuses on the effect and experience of the text, the “part of the iceberg which 
shows above the surface” and not on a scientific investigation of the parts below (EIC 45). Lewis 
himself seems aware that no foolproof equation can be settled in the mind about the concept of 
                                                
52 The 1947 essay “On Stories” originated from an address called “The Kappa Element in Romance” given in 1940 
to the literary society of University College, Oxford (OTOW 20). The essay “On Science Fiction” was an address 
given to the Cambridge University English Club on November 24, 1955 (OTOW 21). The chapter “On Myth” 
follows later in 1961. 
53 In one of his early letters to Arthur Greeves, Lewis laments at Arthur’s inability to grasp “the main gist of the 
story” since every “proper romance” has a “carefully hidden” inner meaning (TST 124). This “inner meaning” is the 
something else, the special quality hidden within a text in Lewis’s later conception of Story.  
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Story, but he is willing to probe the edges and affix rational terms to the parts that can be labeled. 
For Lewis, Story is not a genre, but a quality that may be found in any kind of text. The 
remainder of this section will outline Lewis’s characteristics of Story, using the same texts, “On 
Stories” and “On Myth.”  
 A general requirement of Lewis’s Story text is the sense of “otherness” produced in the 
reader. In a letter to Arthur Greeves, Lewis remarks about his desire that a Story must have “the 
hint of another world—one must ‘hear the horns of elfland’” (CL II 103).54 The genres of 
romance, fairy tale, and science fiction immediately come to mind, but again, Lewis’s idea of 
Story cannot be tagged to any one genre. In his poem, “An Expostulation: Against too many 
writers of science fiction,” Lewis laments the lack of otherness in so many texts where it might 
be expected (Poems 58).55 It is not enough to just set an earthly story of “Crooks, spies, 
conspirators, or love” in another galaxy (l.8). Lewis is after a certain atmosphere, wishing to 
leave earth only if the “Unearthly waits” (l. 14): 
 Strangeness that moves us more than fear, 
 Beauty that stabs with tingling spear, 
 Or Wonder, laying on one’s heart 
 That finger-tip at which we start (l. 15-18). 
Lewis ends the poem with a call to the “something else” beyond the text: “As if some thought 
too swift and shy / For reason’s grasp had just gone by” (l. 19-20). Lewis references David 
Lindsay’s story, Voyage to Arcturus, as an example—it is not enough to go to another world, the 
Story must move us into “the only real ‘other world’ we know, that of the spirit” (OTOW 36). 
Lewis found Lindsay’s planet Tormance to be “a region of spirit” (OTOW 35). The idea of 
                                                
54 March 25, 1933. 
55 This poem was originally published in the Magazine of Fantasy and Science, XVI (June 1959). 
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“spirit” should immediately remind us of Lewis’s region of mythic or heavenly Reality, that 
place that is only sensed through the imagination. Edward Uszynski, in his article “C. S. Lewis 
as Scholar of Metaphor, Narrative, and Myth,” applies this test to Lewis’s own fictional works, 
arguing that Lewis uses narrative to “create a sense of universal otherness” where the reader 
“wakes to new dimensions, new plausibilities, and new encounters with experience” (242). 
 Story also may include elements of the fantastic or the supernatural, which may or may 
not contribute to the sense of otherness. There is, however, no requirement that the reader must 
believe in the earthly impossibilities that often are present in these stories (OTOW 36, EIC 44). 
Corbin Scott Carnell calls these stories the result of “Arch-nature” invading or approaching 
“nature” (Bright 107). This closeness of the otherworldly then inspires men to produce “tales 
which have the singular fantastic quality which we associate with myth” (Bright 107). Carnell’s 
term “Arch-nature” means something similar to the term “Reality” used here—the place outside 
of the frame that accounts for things other than the earthly. Thus, the Story produces a mythic 
experience that can touch the emotions, but is always “grave” and serious in tone (EIC 44). 
Lewis’s ideal Story can produce joy in the reader, but it is never comic in nature.56 
 Lewis notes that we never read these types of stories for the characters: the beings in 
these stories “are shapes moving in another world. We feel indeed that the pattern of their 
movements has a profound relevance to our own life, but we do not imaginatively transport 
ourselves into theirs” (EIC 44). There is no immediate identification, no sense that they inhabit 
our realities. Either the characters are part of a greater Reality, or they reside in some parallel 
existence that we cannot touch. Their world contains its own logic—what Lewis calls the logic 
of a fairy tale. There are rules and codes that must not be broken, but those same laws would be 
                                                
56 When Lewis uses the term “comic” here, he is not referring to the literary definition of comedy—a text with a 
resolution. He means, rather, that myth is not humorous in nature. 
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an absurdity in our own world (OTOW 37-8). Lewis gives the example of the fulfilled prophecy 
theme, the Oedipus-like stories where any steps taken to hinder the end actually lead to its 
conclusion (OTOW 39).57  
 All these elements serve to bypass the intellect. Using the example of Oedipus, Lewis 
explains how Story “does what no theorem can quite do”—the intellect may have great difficulty 
reconciling fate and free will, but the story of Oedipus allows the mind to enter a place where 
inconsistencies seem to fit together (OTOW 39). Colin Duriez explains this in his work “Myth, 
Fact and Incarnation”: “A principle that appears contradictory and paradoxical as an abstraction . 
. . can work satisfactorily, organically and integrally in a narrative” (“Myth” 77). In Uszynski’s 
words, the “reason is never denied, but it is transcended” within these kinds of narrative (231). 
While the mind resides in the Story, a certain level of natural disbelief must be suspended. In 
another place, Lewis applies the value of this sidestepping of the intellect to the stories of 
religion, where a “veil of familiarity” hinders the mind’s receptivity and belief. What if you take 
ideas “about God or about the sufferings of Christ” and place them “into an imaginary world”? 
Could a Story, he wonders, “steal past those watchful dragons” that the reason posts at the door 
of the mind (OTOW 73)?58 The intellect needs a certain degree of surprise in order to disrupt it 
out of established habits of thought. Stories can communicate something new to the reader, 
something outside of every thought-pattern that already resides in the reason. The reason will 
take the new data and will naturally try to “conceptualize—this something”—then new ideas 
may be permitted entry to the “soul’s acropolis” (EIC 45, Poems 81, l.1). The intellect’s 
abstractions will be renewed and broadened, yet will never achieve full mastery over the awe 
                                                
57 Lewis gives the example of Oedipus here, but also The Man Who Would Be King (Rudyard Kipling) and The 
Hobbit (J.R.R. Tolkien) (OTOW 39). 
58 This essay, “Sometimes Fairy Stories May Say Best What’s to be Said,” was first published in The New York 
Times Book Review, November 18, 1956. 
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present in the imagination. Eden may be glimpsed, but the whole of the experience is still beyond 
words. 
 The persistent theme in Lewis’s conception of Story is that of a mood, or an atmosphere, 
that the Story as a whole produces. Lewis applies this to the mythopoeic works of George 
MacDonald: “The meaning, the suggestion, the radiance, is incarnate in the whole story: it is 
only by chance that you find any detachable merits” (GMD 17).59 In Story, some “quality of the 
real universe” is imaginatively experienced (GMD 21). This experience is not just in the 
excitement from danger or suspense, not “actual surprises,” but the quality of “surprisingness” 
within the whole text (OTOW 41). There is always something more: the characters are not just 
men; they may be giants or bandits. The silence on the moon is not just danger; it is an 
experience of the universal “exclusion and desolation” of the human race (OTOW 33). Lewis’s 
ideal Story allows “the poetry of the basic idea” to seep through the plot (OTOW 34), permits the 
theme to sink deeper into the soul than mere suspense allows, and places a “hushing spell on the 
imagination” (OTOW 28). Lewis repeats this concept in “On Myth,” defining Story as a narrative 
that does not rely on the normal methods of suspense to keep the reader focused (EIC 43). The 
text is “more like a thing than a narration,” an object that the reader experiences almost tangibly 
(EIC 43). It is this goal that Lewis sought in his allegory, The Pilgrim’s Regress, hoping for a 
“touch of mythical life” where the meaning is sensed like a “smell or a taste,” where the reader 
would get to know the text like you would a person or a town (PR 12).60 
 The final key characteristic of Story is Lewis’s opinion that the literary value of the text 
has little to do with the power of the Story itself. Lewis cites Rider Haggard’s stories—here the 
                                                
59 Lewis says that the reading of George MacDonald’s book Phantastes served “to convert, even to baptize . . . my 
imagination. It did nothing to my intellect nor (at that time) to my conscience” (GMD 21). 
60 Many scholars believe that Lewis did not succeed in obtaining a mythical quality in the allegory The Pilgrim’s 
Regress. Schakel says, “Lewis’s allegory is far from the best; he is unable to embody his material in images and 
events sufficiently to make it directly apprehendable by the imagination” (Reason 121). 
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reader is somehow able to “tolerate all faults” in Haggard’s books, simply because something 
else, something separate from the way the story is presented, keeps the reader in the narrative 
(OTOW 130). It does not matter who writes the tale, or in what form it is presented, these kinds 
of stories will maintain their power over readers (EIC 42). Thus, Lewis identifies two kinds of 
delight in Story: a literary delight in the style of narrative and a delight in the myth itself (EIC 
46). The myth is extra-literary and is not tied to any specific pattern of words. Narrative, then, is 
simply a container for the myth; it cannot be the myth itself. Lewis may have chosen the term 
myth to label the kind of stories that have mythic power, but his earlier idea of Story is clearer for 
the purposes of this paper. The Story is the whole of the text; the myth is living within it, but not 
in any one part or in any rational account of the plot. Lewis makes this clear in the preface to 
George MacDonald: An Anthology: 
Myth does not essentially exist in words at all. We all agree that the story of Balder is a 
great myth, a thing of inexhaustible value. But whose version—whose words—are we 
thinking when we say this? For my own part, the answer is that I am not thinking of any 
one’s words . . . What really delights and nourishes me is a particular pattern of events, 
which would equally delight and nourish if it had reached me by some medium which 
involved no words at all—a mime or silent film. (GMD 15)  
Lewis continues, comparing myth to its closest literary relative, poetry, where the body of the 
poem is made of words and the theme “is the soul.” In myth, however, the body is “the imagined 
events and something inexpressible is the soul” (GMD 16). Starr, in his article on meaning in 
Lewis’s work, calls myth “a kind or mode of languaging” made of images “capable of a richer 
kind of signification than is language” (169). The myth communicates, but only within and 
through the whole of the container of the Story. Any attempt to remove it and dissect it rationally 
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will collapse it into allegory and reduce its meaning to a series of abstracted truths. According to 
Carnell, the myth is something outside the capabilities of descriptive language (Bright 106). Like 
a jar containing perfumed air, the Story shapes and conveys the myth—that sweet smell that will 
dissipate once the jar is opened. The myth cannot be examined outside of the context of Story, 
but it is not defined and limited by the narrative itself.  
Story: A Provisional Solution 
 
In this movement outward from the Myth-core of reality to the word-dense region of Story, we 
are still dogged by determined cries of falsity. Lewis continually places Myth side by side with 
Reality and Eternal Truth, and argues for a Divinity persistent in the use of earthly pagan myths 
to send mankind truths in whatever form possible. Lewis’s conception of myth does not align 
with the popular myth-as-untruth definition. Now, in this shift to narrative and Story, the same 
popular conception follows us—in a time when “factual realism” is valued, fiction, with its tag 
of falsehood, is automatically devalued. Fiction is placed with myth in the camp of the 
imagination and the rational mind is often excluded. The old battleground between the 
Humanities and the Sciences remains and there seems to be no reconciling of the parties 
involved. The literary community has responded by attempting to take up the tools of the reason 
and scientific language and reduce the traditional narrative component of stories. Annie Dillard 
laments the lack of true storytelling when narration became optional post-WWI, but admits that 
the appeal to the reason has increased: “essay-like fictions are unlikely to engage deeply our 
senses or our hearts. But their attraction for the mind may be considerable” (Living 47). The 
reduction, focusing now on the management of words instead of meaning in story (Scott 142-3), 
is the very thing Lewis feared would come with the dominance of “factual realism.” The 
rejection of meta-narrative has filtered down into the realm of narrative, often forcing plotlines 
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into fragmentation, valuing scientific abstraction and a purity of text (Uszynski 232). Fiction and 
narrative are too vague, too messy, and thus often labeled as false. 
 Lewis argues that there is nothing new here: the fiction versus fact debate has been raging 
for centuries—Lewis traces it back to Plato (EL 318). The debate is just part of the whole human 
dilemma that has concerned him from the start. Lewis’s discussion centres on the sixteenth-
century literary world in his Oxford History volume. “The debate,” he says, “is simply the 
difficult process by which Europe became conscious of fiction as an activity distinct from history 
on the one hand and from lying on the other” (EL 319). Lewis traces the evolution of Platonic 
thought, including Francis Bacon, who calls poetry “feigned history” and yet deems poetry 
essential because humans cannot account for all things based on nature alone (EL 320). This 
summary of the Christianized sixteenth-century Platonic dualism could read as Lewis’s own 
philosophy: “Nature was not the whole. Above the earth was heaven: behind the phenomenal, the 
metaphysical. To that higher region the human soul belonged” (EL 320-1). Lewis recognizes that 
a valuing of “feigned history,” what he would later label Story, seems like “escapism” to the 
modern reader (EL 320).61 For the Neoplatonist, however, creating fiction or poetry was not an 
escape from reality “into a merely subjective refuge” but a “reascending from a world which he 
had a right to call ‘foolish’ and asserting his divine origin” (EL 320). We are still asking the 
question, wondering if an author/artist has a “right to feign, to ‘make things up’” (EL 318)—is 
the imagination permitted to enter regions the reason has no footprint in? Later in Lewis’s 
                                                
61 Lewis addresses the problem of “escapism” in more detail An Experiment in Criticism. The term “escapism” is 
often used against texts considered false or mere fictions. However, “all reading,” says Lewis, “is an escape. It 
involves a temporary transference of the mind from our actual surroundings to things merely imagined or conceived. 
This happens when we read history or science no less than when we read fictions. All escape is from the same thing; 
immediate, concrete actuality” (EIC 68). What is more important, however, is “what we escape to” (EIC 68). The 
suffix “-ism” added on suggests “a confirmed habit of escaping too often . . . or into the wrong things” (EIC 69). 
What Lewis is doing is moving the term away from the texts—those perceived as limited because of their fictional 
basis—to the readers themselves. Reading as “escape” is not a negative thing, but the reader who gets into a habit of 
“escapism” may be—“escape is not necessarily joined to escapism” (EIC 69). 
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history, he gives Spenser as an example of a sixteenth-century author at home in Platonic 
dualism. According to Lewis, Spenser saw the natural and historical world as only a small piece 
of the “whole story”; Spenser could “tolerate the indignities of time” because of his belief that 
they would be overshadowed by an eternity that would make the “truths” of this world seem 
“foolish” (EL 393).  
 The texts that Lewis references in both “On Stories” and “On Myth” are what we would 
label as fictions—science fiction, courtly romance, fairy tale, and adventure stories. These stories 
are filled with the imaginary: pre-Space Age voyages, talking animals, unearthly creatures, and 
unlikely scenarios that instill horror or awe and make readers sharply catch their breath. These 
are not sanitized, “slice of life” realities that the reason readily accepts. Lewis is fighting for 
plain narration, the basic plodding plot interwoven with themes that touch on mythic Realities. 
Story, for Lewis, is a way to the “thing itself”—the plot is the linear, time-bound series of events 
that acts as a “net whereby to catch something else” (OTOW 42). The “something else” is what 
Lewis calls the “theme,” something that has no sequence and is thus outside of time. The theme 
is more like a state or a quality, what Lewis elsewhere calls the atmosphere or the “thing” hidden 
(OTOW 43). In his reading of Phantastes, Lewis found “goodness”—not as a conception of 
moralism but as “sweet air blowing from ‘the land of righteousness,’” an “elusive Form which if 
once seen must inevitably be desired with all but sensuous desire—the thing (in Sappho’s 
phrase) ‘more gold than gold’” (GMD 21-22). The task of the plot is to somehow “incarnate 
what the author is imagining,” to somehow hide within it the “thing” more Real than earthly 
reality (OTOW 43). Lewis calls the “internal tension” between the plot and the theme the story’s 
“chief resemblance to life”—daily life (like the plot) frustratingly gets in the way of what really 
matters (the theme) (OTOW 44). It is a whole system of mirrors and frames: the Story is 
   
 48 
contained in our daily life, the plot forms the basic structure of the Story, and the theme is 
submerged someplace within the plot. The Story as a whole provides a mythic experience (to 
varying degrees and differing according to the receptivity of the imagination of each individual 
reader) through the interaction of the plot and theme and thus allows the reader to experience the 
“thing itself.” In other words, the Story is a play between Ricoeur’s episodic and configurational 
dimensions within narrative. The Story, with its linear narration, provides a means to experience 
the myth hidden within the text. 
 The Story, at times, is more than just the “net” to catch the “thing”—some stories reach 
the stature of a concrete object for Lewis. This occurs when “the thing” or the myth behind the 
Story becomes so clear in the imagination, that the whole text begins to personify the “thing 
itself.” In a letter to Christian Hardie, Lewis explains his own reading habits: “The difference 
isn’t exactly that I read a novel for the characters. It’s more that for me a novel, or any work of 
art, is primarily a Thing, an Object, enjoyed for its colour, proportions, atmosphere, its flavor—
the Odyssey-ishness of the Odyssey or the Learishness of K Lear” (CL III 102).62 Lewis is 
reading with his imagination, seeking something hidden within the plot. The more a Story can 
expose and convey the hidden myth, the more it is able to reach “Object” status and does not 
need to depend on normal narrative methods like suspense and surprise; again, the Story 
becomes “more like a thing than a narration” (EIC 43). The reader has a chance to experience the 
Concrete Reality because the Story can “present in palpable form not concepts or even 
experiences but whole classes of experience” (OTOW 74). While rational fiction may “comment 
on life,” Lewis prefers his imaginative Story that adds something we cannot seem to get through 
our ordinary day-to-day life (OTOW 74). Lewis repeats this idea in another essay, comparing 
stories to “certain rare dreams” that “enlarge our conception of the range of possible 
                                                
62 March 27, 1951. 
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experiences” (OTOW 93).63 For a receptive reader, these stories embody the “thing itself,” 
moving the rational mind into new reflections of Reality.  
 Lewis is not attempting to rationally account for how a Story does this, and perhaps that 
is impossible. The experience of the Story, however, is something that Lewis seems unable to 
live without. In his text “On Science Fiction,” Lewis acknowledges the power of these stories: 
those that incorporate the “mythopoeic” seem to tap into a “mode of imagination which does 
something to us at a deep level” (OTOW 95). The one who reads and receives says, “I shall never 
escape this. This will never escape me. These images have struck roots far below the surface of 
my mind” (EIC 48-9). Hart situates “mythopoeia” as the “basis of narrative,” the thing that 
“charges literature with its vitality” (Through 18). All children (and adults too), Lewis insists, 
should have such an experience. When Lewis is trying to combat improper loves (in this case 
diseased patriotism) in The Four Loves, he suggests that all children can be “strengthened by the 
image of the past” through stories presented as Story (as opposed to legend disguised as text-
book fact) (FL 28). He continues, “the emphasis should be on the tale as such, on the picture that 
fires the imagination, the example that strengthens the will” (FL 28). The child should get a 
chance to “feel . . . that he is hearing saga” (FL 28). The textbook engages the reason, and should 
be used for systematic historical study, but Lewis feels children should also have their 
imagination exercised by stories that convey mythic elements. 
 Yet, Lewis wants to go deeper—not only does he desire an experience of Reality and a 
chance to reach parts of earthly life that would be impossible without Story, but he also is 
seeking soul and mind transformation. In the “Preface” to George MacDonald’s works, Lewis 
says that Story “hits us at a level deeper than our thoughts or even our passions, troubles oldest 
certainties till all questions are re-opened, and in general shocks us more fully awake than we are 
                                                
63 “On Science Fiction.” 
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for most of our lives” (GMD 17). Reason can only consider what is already known, what is in the 
conscious mind. The only way to change our thinking is to gain access to something outside of 
our minds. John Navone, in the book Towards a Theology of Story, quotes from Michael Novak 
and concludes that “men seldom act according to principles and rules stated in words and 
logically arranged; they act, rather, according to models, metaphors, stories and myths” (77). 
Story not only rearranges the furniture of our minds but also adds new windows and allows our 
eyes to see more. Lewis concludes An Experiment in Criticism with his foundational reason for 
reading imaginative literature: 
Literary experience heals the wound, without undermining the privilege, of individuality . 
. . in reading great literature I become a thousand men and yet remain myself. Like the 
night sky in the Greek poem, I see with a myriad eyes, but it is still I who see. Here, as in 
worship, in love, in moral action, and in knowing, I transcend myself; and am never more 
myself than when I do.” (EIC 140-1) 
The Story allows us to enter other plots and narratives beyond our own limited lives, enlarging 
our experience of reality/Reality and moving us closer to sight. The Story-container is time-
bound, and thus parallels our own lives. The temporal plot allows us a chance to experience the 
mythic, unwordable Reality that we could not otherwise touch, giving a brief space of unity 
between the reason and the imagination. 
 The Story ends, however, and the book is put away. The reader must return again and 
again to Story because the wound-gash between our faculties still bleeds. Lewis does not 
guarantee perfection; the solution is only provisional. Thus, we are still haunted by a desire for 
more of something we cannot quite understand. Lewis’s Story plot is the “imperfect . . . net of 
time and event” used “for catching what is not really a process at all” (OTOW 45). We turn to 
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Story because our own life is restricted to tensed events, seemingly lacking a theme, separated 
from any sort of mythic Reality. In the Story we catch glimpses of grander themes and find a 
release “from the stranglehold of temporality” (Uszynski 244). This is what Lewis refers to at the 
end of the essay “On Stories”:  
In life and art both, as it seems to me, we are always trying to catch in our net of 
successive moments something that is not successive. Whether in real life there is any 
doctor who can teach us how to do it, so that at last either the meshes will become fine 
enough hold the bird, or we be so changed that we can throw our nets away and follow 
the bird to its own country, is not a question for this essay. But I think it is sometimes 
done—or very, very, nearly done—in stories. (OTOW 45) 
Lewis believes that a tensed life can never wholly possess the Myth beyond; the “internal tension 
in the heart of every story” resembles our own lives (OTOW 44). We are outside Eden and 
unable to see heaven. The myth is never quite “embodied” in the relentless moving of the plot. 
The idea fades, and the bird flies away. This is always the case, unless, of course, some sort of 
transformation occurred through the reading of the Story. What if the Story re-shaped the 
reader’s mind to such a degree that a closer unity between reason and imagination remains once 
the book is closed? 
 According to Lewis, it happened once—the unworded Myth Reality entered our worded 
reality and became “embodied” in the plot of history. The Story of the Gospels remains; it speaks 
of the Incarnated Word, and whispers a strange tale of a dying and resurrecting god that the 
tellers actually believed was real. For the writers and tellers of the Gospel Story, the Myth 
equaled Fact—the Athene and Demeter divisions in the mind had been resolved into belief, and 
imagination and reason now could speak the same. Some view the story as human myth and not 
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Eternal Fact; others are quite ready to assign Christ to a historical position but to disregard 
Divine Myth. However, Lewis wants a complete unity of Myth and Fact. William C. Johnson, in 
a discussion of imagination and Lewis, states: “Perhaps myth became history in Christ, but 
history—the phase of rational-material consciousness—must again become myth, through willed 
imagination of the incarnate word” (“Lewis” 39). 
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Chapter 4: Till We Have Faces 
Textual Metamorphosis: Pagan Myth Retold as Story 
 
The textual source for Lewis’s novel Till We Have Faces is found in Apuleius’s work, the 
Metamorphoses, also titled The Golden Ass.64 The Cupid and Psyche story is one of several tales 
inserted into the frame story of Lucius, Apuleius’s wandering hero. Lucius, propelled forwards 
by Fortune, goes through a series of sufferings and transformations (hence the title), and along 
the way has many tales to tell. The traditional view of inset tales, the “story within a story” 
motif, was used to “illuminate the larger whole,” and many scholars have situated the Cupid and 
Psyche story as the key for understanding Lucius’s journey (Kenney 12). The opening of the 
Metamorphoses argues that the story is for entertainment only, but many have read it for deeper 
meanings, looking for hidden ideas in the text. In particular, the story of Cupid and Psyche is 
often read allegorically.65 Others call it a myth (in the sense of general pagan mythology in 
Lewis’s terms), or a literary fable (Edwards 67). Peter Schakel notes that Apuleius’s tale lacks 
“imaginative and numinous qualities”; it is not filled with Lewis’s ideal mythic Story, but with 
“folk motifs and archetypes” (Reason 61). Lewis himself calls the Metamorphoses a fantasy in 
An Experiment in Criticism (50) and labels Apuleius’s story of Cupid and Psyche an earthly 
“myth” in a letter (CL III 633).66  
                                                
64 The title Metamorphoses was found on a manuscript; the title The Golden Ass comes from a comment of 
Augustine: Apuleius in libris, quos asini aurei titulo inscripsit (Civ. Dei 18.18) (Kenney 2). 
65 The seeming simplicity of Apuleius’s text encourages this type of reading, as does the names of minor characters 
within the text: “Habit” (VI.8.5),“Care,” and “Sorrow” (VI.9.2) are all part of Venus’s household; Cupid is called 
“Love” at times; and the baby born of Cupid and Psyche is called “Pleasure” (VI.24.4). 
66 Letter to Christian Hardie on July 31, 1955. 
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Lewis first read the Cupid and Psyche tale as a young man, and later began several 
attempts at poetic retellings.67 In 1923, he wrote in his diary, “My head was very full of my old 
idea of a poem on my own version of the Cupid and Psyche story” (AMR 266). In 1955, he wrote 
to Christian Hardie: “the idea of re-writing the old myth . . . has been in my mind ever since I 
was an undergraduate . . . I’ve been at work on Orual for 35 years” (CL III 633). In a note after 
the text of Till We Have Faces, Lewis calls Apuleius his “source” rather than an “influence” or 
“model” (313).68 From the start, Lewis “felt quite free to go behind Apuleius,” and alters the 
story by making “Psyche’s palace invisible to normal, mortal eyes” (TWHF 313). This alteration, 
as well as Lewis’s choice of the elder sister Orual as the main narrator, is consistent throughout 
the whole evolution of Lewis’s tale (CL III 633). What did change, however, was the relationship 
between Orual and the supernatural beings in the story: “in my pre-Christian days she was to be 
in the right and the gods in the wrong” (CL III 633). Lewis outlines the final version in another 
letter: “Divine Love gradually conquers, first, a Pagan (and almost savage) soul’s 
misconceptions of the Divine (as Ungit), then shallow ‘enlightenment’ (the Fox), and, most of 
all, her jealousy of the real God, whom she hates till near the end because she wants Psyche to be 
entirely hers” (CL III 1419).69 In Lewis’s text, we see very little of Psyche—especially of her 
grief and wanderings (which differs from Apuleius’s version)—and much more of Orual, the 
jealous sister contending with the gods. In a discussion with his publisher, Lewis calls his text a 
“re-interpretation” since he changes “the accepted motivation” of the old tale (CL III 779).70 
Despite the obvious change—the choice to focus on Orual’s battle with the gods—the presence 
                                                
67 Lewis’s first mention of the story shows up in a letter to Arthur Greeves, January 28, 1917 (TST 158). Peter 
Schakel’s chapter on Till We Have Faces in The Cambridge Companion to C. S. Lewis has a detailed outline of the 
genesis of Lewis’s version of the story (281-3). 
68 For further reading on the difference between a “source” and an “influence,” see Lewis’s essay “The Literary 
Impact of the Authorised Version” found in Selected Literary Essays (133-134). 
69 Letter to Patricia Mackey, March 26, 1963. 
70 Letter to John H. McCallum, August 11, 1956.  
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of the gods is distant in the text itself, the whole realm of the gods recedes and rarely intrudes 
into the narrative. The “certainty of supernatural causality,” present in Apuleius’s version is 
removed in Lewis’s story—all the conniving and jealousy of Venus and the communication 
among the gods is removed or hidden (Manlove, Literary 194). Lewis moves the text out of 
earthly mythology and into the daily realities of human life.71 Orual struggles with the 
hiddenness of the gods; she disbelieves them, stands in judgment over them, and generally lives 
life separate from Divine presence. Lewis is toying with our accepted ideas about mythological 
texts—re-inventing the old myth into something different. 72 
 At this point, we will take a diversion into the reception of Till We Have Faces and its 
general classification by scholars, before any attempt to examine the text itself. The subtitle of 
Till We Have Faces, “A Myth Retold,” has immediately focused attention on the book as 
“myth”—although some early reviewers of the book labeled it as “allegory.” Marjorie Wright, in 
keeping with her dissertation topic, calls the text a “myth” with “psychological and religious 
depths,” while still admitting that it seems allegorical at times (55, 56). Lewis’s friend, Owen 
Barfield, notes that it is more myth than allegory (Light xx-xxi). Some, like Michael Christensen, 
call it “myth” but maintain that parts of it are still allegorical (Scripture 61). Others, like R. J. 
Reilly, are more definite, insisting that a “myth retold remains a myth, not an allegory” 
(Romantic 125). Albert Reddy and Sharon Jebb also classify the text as myth (Reddy 153, Jebb 
113). Clyde S. Kilby, connecting with the mythic-religious tale of the priest in Essur at the end of 
                                                
71 A listing of differences between the texts of Apuleius and Lewis has been detailed elsewhere, see especially Mara 
Donaldson’s list in her book Holy Places are Dark Places: C. S. Lewis and Paul Ricoeur on Narrative 
Transformation (10-11). Joe R. Christopher compares the ordering of the events between the two versions in his 
article “The Labors of Psyche: A Sorting of Events,” found in The Bulletin of the New York C. S. Lewis Society from 
1975. 
72 This paper will not detail the plot of Till We Have Faces as many earlier articles and books have done. Because 
the book was not as widely received and read as Lewis’s other fictional works, plot summaries were often deemed 
necessary before any discussion of themes and textual form could be done. For example, Clyde S. Kilby’s writings 
on Till We Have Faces contain extensive plot outlines.  
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Part I, calls the story “a myth within a myth” (Christian 63). Another dissertation, written by 
Rosemary Wright, calls it a “re-written pagan myth” (5), a text that fits Lewis’s conception of 
earthly mythology and which functions as a praeparatio evangelica for a pagan audience 
(“Biblical”15-16). Corbin Scott Carnell calls it “the most complex and perhaps the most 
beautiful myth Lewis has ever done” (Bright 115). In another place, Carnell calls it a “pre-realist 
mythic narrative,” acknowledging that there is much realistic detail present, but still insisting that 
Lewis is “weaving a myth, not writing a realistic novel” (“Novelist” 3).  
Others posit that Lewis is attempting to reconstruct an original mythic version that could, 
as it were, go behind and become the source for Apuleius. Reilly, who calls the text “myth,” sees 
Lewis as “recreat[ing] the ancient consciousness which saw a part of reality in terms of myth” 
(118). Dean Loganbill goes into this at length, concluding that Till We Have Faces is “a work of 
imagination to reconstruct the primitive mythopoeic consciousness,” and a means “to discover 
the true myth behind” Apuleius’s redaction (“Myth” 56). As such, he believes the modern reader 
is out of place and will have difficulty receiving such a text (“Myth” 57). Reddy notes that Lewis 
is trying to find the original “outlines and significance” of the myth which has been “distorted 
and obscured in its transmission” (“TWHF” 161-2). Another perspective focuses on the text as 
the Christianizing of a pagan myth. Evan Gibson calls Till We Have Faces “a Christian treatment 
of pre-Christian material” (C.S. Lewis 16). Reilly also includes the idea of the “end of paganism” 
within his analysis and considers the story “a preamble to Lewis’s mythical version of 
Christianity” (Romantic 116-7). This is similar to Edward Zogby’s description of Till We Have 
Faces as “the last chapter of pagan myth before the Incarnation” (“Triadic” 34). Finally, Mineko 
Honda calls the text a “meticulous retold version of the Christian myth” (Imaginative 139).73 
                                                
73 Some scholars have limited the text of Till We Have Faces by trying to force it into a strict Christian 
interpretation. Biblical allusions do abound (see the dissertation of Rosemary Wright), and Lewis was certainly 
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Using the term “myth,” however, is problematic unless we place it within Lewis’s own 
conception of earthly mythology and Divine Myth.  
 The scholars, however, who align most closely with the position of this paper, categorize 
Till We Have Faces as a modern realistic novel. Joe R. Christopher positions the book as the best 
example of Lewis’s romance writing, a text that “subordinates its archetypal patterns to a semi-
historic setting and a biographical plot” (“Romances” 326). John Lawlor, with his qualification 
of his label of “myth” according to Lewis’s use in An Experiment in Criticism, fits with the 
argument here (“Tutor” 81). Stella Gibbons classifies the text as a “Homeric or Icelandic saga” 
with “a Jamesian subtlety of psychology” (“Imaginative” 94). Rebecca Radmacher calls it a 
modernist text, a book attempting to explore “truth that was too complex and ‘unsayable’ to be 
embodied in pervious forms” of the novel genre (“Nothing” 6). Reddy modifies his earlier 
statement, noting that Orual can move outside of the myth and tell her story, making the text 
“both a novel and a myth” (“TWHF” 161-2). According to Curtis Gruenler, Lewis uses the 
“frame of a realistic novel,” to contain “both myth and fairy tale” (“C.S. Lewis” 259). Honda 
cites the psychological depth and the complexity of good and evil as two factors that bring the 
label of “novel” closer to the Till We Have Faces text (Imaginative 109). Doreen Wood agrees, 
calling it a “realistic novel” and “a kind of historical novel” with mythic themes (“Pattern” 35, 
1). Doris Myers, in her book Bareface, uses the novel classification of Till We Have Faces as a 
theme in her discussion of the story. Myers considers it a “realistic modern novel” (3-4) that 
removes the Cupid and Psyche myth from the “realm of fantasy” and places it into “history” 
(Bareface 51). Schakel argues that the setting of Glome is not vague enough to fit with the 
universal character of traditional myths, and agrees with Doris Myers’s novelistic focus 
                                                                                                                                                       
informed by Christian thought and belief, but the text deserves a treatment based on narrative and literary theory as 
well. Doris Myers insists that if the book is “read without archetypal or Christian pre-conceptions, the book emerges 
as a stylistic tour de force” (In Context xiii). 
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(Cambridge 283). Finally, Mark Freshwater’s comment extends the issue of classification into 
our reason/imagination conflict: “Rather than attempting to analyze the human personality 
through reason, Lewis attempted to portray its innermost workings through myth, making myth 
come alive through fictional narrative” (C.S. Lewis 2). Applying the terms of “realism” and 
“novelistic” to Lewis’s reading of the Cupid and Psyche story therefore places Till We Have 
Faces in a different category than that of traditional understandings of “myth” and “allegory.” 
 In a discussion like this, we must not lose sight of Lewis’s own opinions. Although Lewis 
readily admits that an author cannot know everything about his own work, since this paper 
attempts to follow Lewis’s concepts of myth and reality, we must also consider his own 
reflections on Till We Have Faces. From the start, Lewis felt his book was misunderstood. 
Repeatedly in his letters, he comments on the poor reception of the book and the lack of the 
understanding shown in reviews. In a letter dated September 23, 1956 (a few months after the 
publishing of the book), Lewis says that he has received “no reviews yet that show much 
understanding” of the text (CL III 790).74 Although Lewis considered it his “best book,” 
according to the “critics and the public” it appeared to be a “failure” and a “flop” (CL III 1148).75 
In this letter he concludes, “No one seems to have the slightest idea what I’m getting at in it.” A 
year before this letter, in 1959, Lewis needed to correct Peter Milward’s conception of the book: 
“It isn’t an allegory, I was trying to tell a story” (CL III 1090).76 In a letter to Clyde S. Kilby, 
Lewis describes it as “a work of (supposed) historical imagination” (CL III 830).77 Lewis 
continues, describing what he had in mind and emphasizing his lack of allegorical intention: 
                                                
74 Letter to Roger Lancelyn Green. 
75 Letter to Audrey Sutherland on April 28, 1960.  
76 September 24, 1959. 
77 February 10, 1957. 
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[Till We Have Faces is] a guess of what it might have been like in a little barbarous state 
on the borders of the Hellenistic world of Greek culture, just beginning to affect it . . . 
Much that you take as allegory was intended solely as realistic detail. The Wagon men 
are Nomads from the steppes. The children made mud pies not for symbolic purposes but 
because children do. The Pillar Room is simply a room. (CL III 830) 
Note Lewis’s mention of “realistic detail”— here we must turn to Lewis’s use of fictional 
realism in Till We Have Faces.  
 Lewis outlines his theory of realism in fiction in the chapter “On Realisms” in An 
Experiment in Criticism. The plurality of the title refers to two kinds of realism—“realism of 
presentation” and “realism of content.” Lewis defines realism of presentation as “the art of 
bringing something close to us, making it palpable and vivid, by sharply observed or sharply 
imagined detail (EIC 57).78 Lewis calls it a sense of “weather” or “countryside” that surrounds or 
provides a backdrop for the action of the text (EIC 58). Lewis personally found stories that 
lacked this backdrop unappealing. He says of The Three Musketeers, that though there is much 
excitement in the story, there is a “total lack of atmosphere . . . There is no country in the book—
save as a storehouse of inns and ambushes. There is no weather. When they cross to London 
there is no feeling that London differs from Paris” (OTOW 29). Lewis finds that this type of 
realism often occurs in texts that are not “‘realistic’ in the sense of being probable or even 
possible” (EIC 59). It is found in medieval romance, for example, or in fantastic fiction—a 
realism present in texts that would be labeled “escapism literature” now (EIC 60). The reader’s 
attention, in these stories, “is fixed on something concrete and individual; on the more than 
ordinary terror, splendor, wonder, pity, or absurdity of a particular case” (EIC 65). Receptive 
                                                
78 Lewis mentions many examples of presentation realism: Chaucer’s friar driving the cat off the bench, the “exact 
specifications of size which are given by direct measurements in Gulliver,” and the dragon “sniffing along the 
stone” in Beowulf (EIC 57). 
   
 60 
readers of this kind of realism do not seek to illuminate their own life but pursue the enjoyment 
of the story for its own sake—the story exists so that they “shall weep, or shudder, or wonder, or 
laugh” as they read (EIC 66). The plot of these stories is often based on “hypothetical 
probability” (EIC 65). If the initial event happened (and this is always based on some authority, 
ancient or not), then the rest of the plot would follow. The reader/listener accepts the initial 
event, however improbable in and of itself, and then sits down to enjoy the story. Stories that 
contain realism of presentation may also fit Lewis’s Story container for myth, presented earlier in 
the text of An Experiment in Criticism—a Story that may contain fantastic elements outside of 
the ordinary life of the reader. 
 Lewis considers the second type, realism of content, the dominant, and at times exclusive 
type of realism used in the modern world. Readers of these stories need not suspend belief, the 
plots are “probable or ‘true to life’” (EIC 59), and they are “the sort of thing that happens” to 
anyone (EIC 61). Here “there is much to be felt and much to be analysed,” much to engage the 
reason, in other words, but “there is nothing to be seen or heard or tasted or touched” (EIC 59). 
This should remind us of Annie Dillard’s lament in Living by Fiction about “purified” literature 
post-WWI. Lewis says it shows up in French tragedy and sometimes in ancient Greek tragedy, 
but the majority of these texts is more recent and follows the example of Middlemarch and 
Vanity Fair (EIC 61-2). Lewis calls this a new trend, and believes that the general pattern 
throughout literary history is not content realism but an author or teller saying, “Listen, I have 
something out of the ordinary to tell you.” A story with realistic content outlines what could and 
has happened to everyone, it contains plot lines that follow everyday realities, and there is little 
surprise for the reader. Often, these stories are called “comments on” or “slices of life” (EIC 60). 
This type of literature strives to be factual, almost scientific: a hard edge of truth pruned of all 
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messy ornamentation. Lewis does not believe that this type of writing is inferior, but warns that 
the “dominant taste at present demands realism of content” and worries that any other type will 
be reneged as improper and thus devalued (EIC 60).79 
 Lewis’s dilemma in the mind still applies—Lewis does not want us to forget about the 
stories that require the use of the imagination, narratives that act as a container for myth. Stories 
that show a realism of presentation even amid improbable situations or fairy tale-like realities 
allow the mind to exercise both rational and imaginative faculties. This is Lewis’s provisional 
solution at work in Story. Till We Have Faces, which Lewis considered his best work, puts into 
practice his theory of the realisms in fiction in order to produce a Story that engages the whole 
person. Till We Have Faces, with the visionary and otherworldly elements (especially in Part II), 
also presents a carefully detailed world filled with realistic features—this fictional text is another 
example of Lewis’s realism of presentation. In a letter to Phoebe Hesketh, before the writing of 
Till We Haves Faces, Lewis asks: “Don’t you think that the more infinite the theme, the harder, 
tighter, severer the poem ought to be?” (CL III 459-60).80 This is what Lewis has done with Till 
We Have Faces—produced a text with the hard edges of realism that nevertheless deals with 
“Eternity and infinity” (CL III 460). 
 Apuleius’s Cupid and Psyche story has little realism, beginning in the universal nature of 
traditional story telling form: “There were in a certain city a king and queen, who had three 
beautiful daughters” (IV.28.1). Psyche is the only human character that is named in the text, her 
parents are simply the “king and queen,” and her elder sisters are called “sisters” or at times, “the 
two wicked women” (V.11.1). The abundance of names in the story belongs to the gods—Venus, 
                                                
79 Lewis notes four possibilities here: literature with realism “of presentation without that of content, as in medieval 
romance: or that of content without that of presentation, as in French (and some Greek tragedy); or both together, as 
in War and Peace; or neither, as in the Furioso or Rasselas or Candide” (EIC 59-60). 
80 April 21, 1954. 
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Zephyr, Jove, Ceres, Juno, and Apollo. The only place names are those in connection to the 
gods: the shrines of Venus at “Paphos, Cnidos,” and “Cythera” (IV.29.3), the “oracle of Apollo 
at Miletus” (IV.32.5), and the entrance to the Underworld near “Sparta, a famous city of Greece” 
(VI.18.1). The vagueness of place and person, evident from the very first line, signals a 
connection to the human system of mythology. There is a remoteness about the story, a kind of 
haziness that renders it easily repeatable; the type of story mothers repeat from memory at 
bedtime, or the tales old men tell around the fire. In fact, the context of this tale is Lucius 
retelling what he overhears a drunken old woman telling a young prisoner (Kenney 13). The 
myth opens with the crucial problem of the youngest sister’s divine beauty, and the subsequent 
jealousy of Venus. In her anger, Venus snaps, “I must share with a mortal girl the honour due to 
my godhead, and my name, established in heaven, is profaned by earthly dirt!” (IV.30.1). 
Apuleius’s tale is filled with scheming, angry gods who frequently speak with mortals and with 
each other. Cupid’s nighttime conversations with Psyche are recorded (V.5, 6, 11, 12), as are 
Psyche’s conversations with other gods, like Ceres (VI.2, 3) and Juno (VI.4), as well as the many 
direct interactions she has with Venus. The world of the gods is open both to the characters 
within the story and to the reader outside the text—there are no invisible palaces, and the gods 
can be met and communed with directly at their shrines. Lewis’s desire for “otherness” in Story 
rarely enters into Apuleius’s tale.  
 Realistic detail, however, is not completely lacking in Lewis’s source. For example, one 
of the elder sisters must care for a rheumatic-ridden husband, forced to “massage his twisted, 
stone-hard, fingers, spoiling” her hands “with stinking compresses and filthy bandages and 
loathsome plasters” (V.10.2). In other places, however, when we might expect more detail, the 
text is vague. Apuleius tells us that the sisters are given “rich eatables and savoury delicacies,” 
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but there is no further detail about the food (V.15.2). When the sisters find Psyche in her palace, 
nothing is said about her appearance (V.7); only later do they comment in their jealousy, “She 
looks in the air and gives off an aura of goddess already” (V.9.7). Lewis, however, describes 
Psyche’s appearance carefully—Psyche does not just give off the “aura of goddess” but looks 
“brightface,” she is tanned and in rags, but has “eyes like two stars” and “smooth and rounded” 
limbs (TWHF 102). Apuleius’s tale has little concern for an exactness of time. Where Apuleius 
states that the sisters “hurriedly made their way” to the rock to find Psyche, Lewis has a whole 
paragraph where Orual carefully plans her trip (TWHF 89).81 Fantastic elements are also 
included in Lewis’s source tale. Apuleius puts instructions for Psyche not only in the mouth of 
gods like Pan (V.25), but also in inanimate objects: the reed tells her how to obtain the golden 
wool safety (VI.12), and the tower dissuades her from suicide and explains how to get to the 
entrance to the Underworld (VI.17-18). Thus, Lewis is working with a source that contains brief 
moments of realistic detail (realism of presentation) and little realism of content. The tale is 
similar to many others found in pagan mythology—a focus on the supernatural world of the 
gods, removed from any specific locality, mixed with elements of fantasy and containing brief 
moments of realistic description. 
 Lewis’s story, especially Part I, has little connection with the narrative style of stories in 
pagan mythology. He transforms the text to produce a modern story, containing much realism of 
presentation (in both parts of the book), combined with realism of content (especially in Part I of 
the book). The gods figure largely in Orual’s anger and complaints, but they themselves intrude 
comparatively little into the narrative—they are remote, otherworldly, and the source of the 
sense of “otherness” that Lewis requires. The gods carry the elements of Divine Myth into the 
narrative. Apuleius’s tale is now metamorphosed into a realistic narrative that allows Divine 
                                                
81 Doris Myers also cites this example (Bareface 51). 
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Myth to hover behind, troubling both Orual and the readers who sense its presence. We shall 
now turn to a more detailed examination to discover what Lewis is doing with the text of the 
Cupid and Psyche story. 
Till We Have Faces: Realisms 
 
Lewis’s opening paragraph of Till We Have Faces introduces the voice of Orual, the elder sister 
narrator, and also sets the tone for the book:  
I am old now and have not much to fear from the anger of gods. I have no husband nor 
child, nor hardly a friend, through whom they can hurt me. My body, this lean carrion 
that still has to be washed and fed and have clothes hung about it daily with so many 
changes, they may kill as soon as they please. The succession is provided for. My crown 
passes to my nephew. (TWHF 3) 
The words are short; the phrases direct and straightforward.82 The basic facts are presented: age, 
lack of relations, lack of fear, and royal position (indicated by the words “succession” and 
“crown”). The descriptive phrase, “lean carrion,” injects a rawness and hardness into the long 
adjectival phrase about her body. She considers herself dead already and not worth the effort to 
kill. Lewis is moving the text from the vagueness of the “Once upon a time” style found in 
Apuleius to an exacting first person account of a woman close to death. The narrative is 
immediately intentional, the words of an individual pleading her case: “I will accuse the gods,” 
Orual says, “especially the god who lives on the Grey Mountain” (TWHF 3). Unlike the tale in 
Apuleius, this god is not named. She continues, “I will tell all he has done to me from the 
beginning, as if I were making my complaint of him before a judge” (TWHF 3). This is to be a 
                                                
82 Myers calls Orual’s language “gritty and harsh,” but argues that her sentences are carefully crafted with rhetorical 
figures like amplification, isocolon, parallelism, and antithesis (In Context 202). Lewis gives his narrator a careful 
mixture of barbarian simplicity of language combined with Greek oratory influences. 
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legal case, and the language will follow suit—throughout the book, Lewis continues the 
preciseness of language that opens the text. Orual specifies which language she is using 
(“Greek”), she has a purpose for her document (the Greek people speak freely about the gods and 
perhaps they will have an answer for her accusation), she makes comments about her text (the 
names of people and places will be in the language of her people), and she has a definite 
beginning point for her account (“I will begin my writing with the day my mother died and they 
cut off my hair”) (TWHF 3-4). She names herself at the beginning of the third paragraph: “I was 
Orual” (TWHF 4). The shift to past tense here sharply differs from the tense of the opening 
line—“I am old now.” Her name belongs to the past. This shifting of tenses occurs throughout 
the narrative; Orual may be attempting to record a pure, historical account of her life, but her 
present ideas about the gods and concerns for accuracy constantly intrude. For instance, right at 
the time when she realizes that she cannot see Psyche’s palace, she interrupts her narrative: “And 
now we are coming to that part of my history on which my charge against the gods chiefly rests; 
and therefore I must try at any cost to write what is wholly true” (TWHF 117). Orual wishes to 
have as scientific and rational an account as possible, and this she mostly accomplishes—the text 
itself displays the hard realism of her life. Her intent is clear, she wishes to “set down the truth” 
and do what she believes no one else has ever done before—accuse the gods (TWHF 245). 
 Orual’s scientific language is evident immediately in her description of the location of 
Glome: directional words are used (“south-east,” “east,” “north”), distances are measured (the 
city is back from the river the distance “a woman can walk in the third of an hour”), and the city 
is placed in relation to other cities (“not more than a day’s journey above Ringal”) (TWHF 4). 
Glome is located on one side of a river called the “Shennit”; the religious house of Ungit is on 
the other side. The city is some distance from Greece, but close enough to be influenced by it—
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she notes that traders come from the Greeklands three times a year (TWHF 6). On her trip up the 
mountain, she comments on the gleam of the sea she sees, but is careful to specify, “it is not to 
be compared with the Great Sea of the Greeks” (TWHF 95). Many scholars have commented on 
the placement of the story in a realistic, earthly setting. James Como considers the fact that 
Glome “is not another world and does not exist in another dimension” and places the city “on 
Earth (in Thrace, or near the Caucasus)” (“Preface” 3). Doris Myers argues that Till We Have 
Faces is “realistic fiction” because Glome is portrayed as if it were a real, historical place 
(Bareface 4).83  
 An attempt at historical veracity also forces Orual to be time conscious. Time is 
associated with specific events: “That year after I fought Redival was the first of the bad 
harvests” (TWHF 26) and “They burnt the dead Queen on the third day” (TWHF 20). The closer 
Orual gets to the main accusation, the more precise her text gets. After Psyche gets called “The 
Accursed!” on the streets, Orual notes that “ruin” did not fall “the next day,” things only 
worsened slowly over a “whole train of days” (TWHF 40). When Orual is waiting in dread for 
Psyche to return from the streets, watching “the shadows of the pillars slowly changing their 
position” she shows an active mind, attentive to the passing of time (TWHF 38). When the priest 
arrives in the palace with the fatal message, Orual reports that he comes seven days after his 
recovery from the fever (TWHF 42). After the sacrifice, Orual decides to gather the remains of 
her sister, but realizes that haste is needed—the first snow comes in “about five and twenty days” 
(TWHF 87). As noted earlier, she plans her trip meticulously. It will take her eight hours to reach 
the Tree (since she is a woman and unused to the rough terrain) and she will need two hours for 
                                                
83 Myers has a more detailed section on the historical period and the possible location of Glome in her book C. S. 
Lewis In Context. Based on details in the text concerning the Fox (his philosophy for instance) she places his capture 
between 310 and 280 B.C.E. Glome may have been located in the Balkans, close to the Danube, or in the Caucasus 
Mountains (193-5). 
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her work there and at least six hours to return home—so she decides to spend the night on the 
mountain (TWHF 89). The second time Orual goes to the mountain, she leaves in secret while 
the King is gone hunting. Orual then writes that he returns from the hunt seven days after her 
own arrival back to the palace, enough time for her stabbed arm to heal (TWHF 181). Stephen 
Medcalf declares this text of Lewis’s “more translucent to the passing of time” than his other 
fictional works, with “immediate” language presenting “concrete objects more abruptly” 
(“Making” 134-5).84  
 The text is not only time and place specific, but also focuses on commonplace realities. 
The detailing of the concrete gives the “impression of scientific, objective reality” that Orual so 
badly needs to authenticate her tale (Myers, Bareface 117). Orual is concerned about careful 
description in her remembering. As a girl, she remembers the “coolness” of her head after the 
haircut, and the “hot sun” on her neck while making mud houses (TWHF 5). The arrival of the 
new Queen is connected in her memory with a “bitter frost” and their play as children sliding on 
the ice that spread “from the byre-door to the big dunghill, what with frozen spills of milk and 
puddles and the stale of beasts” (TWHF 6). She is particularity sensitive to smells: “the whole 
courtyard reeked with the skins” of slaughtered beasts before the wedding (TWHF 10), she 
dislikes the holy smell in the house of Ungit, and later says of the temple “There was as much 
taint of sweat and foul air as (in a mortal’s house) would have set the laziest slut to opening 
windows, scouring and sweeping” (TWHF 269). Further, she remembers the small, “shivering, 
white body with its staring eyes” of her new stepmother that they undressed and left in the 
King’s bed (TWHF 12). The sight of the temple girls is also strange to her, “their gilt paps and 
their huge flaxen wigs and their faces painted till they looked like wooden masks (TWHF 42). 
                                                
84 Myers notes that Orual “measures time in hours, which can be judged by the movement of the sun, but has no 
names for smaller units” (In Context 196). Smaller, sudden time lapses are measured in heartbeats (TWHF 78, 171). 
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Other sights are lodged in her memory: a “fat fly” sluggishly “crawling up the doorpost” (TWHF 
90), on the journey to the Mountain she must cross a “cursed black valley” of “dark moss, dark 
peat-bogs, shingle, great boulders, and screes” spilling from the Mountain like bleeding “sores” 
(TWHF 97), baby Psyche sleeping with the “tiny” “sound of her breathing” (TWHF 21), and 
while travelling in Essur, she notes how “the sunlight on the stubble looked aged and gentle,” 
and sees the “squares of standing corn diminishing” as the reapers sing in their “sweat and 
sunburn and merriment” (TWHF 239, 238). Sounds follow her as well—when her father kills the 
servant boy the night of the Queen’s death, Orual remembers: “the fall of his body sent the 
flagon rolling over and over. It made a great noise in that silence; I hadn’t thought till then that 
the floor of the hall was so uneven” (TWHF 15). On her trip up the mountain, Orual notes the 
heavy silence, “a lark singing; but for that, huge and ancient stillness” (TWHF 95). Lewis is 
building an account of careful detail and realistic presentation, showing his narrator Orual as a 
careful observer.  
 Realism of content enters in as well. The plotline moves as one might expect if Glome is 
a real place in that time of history. Historical details are accurate, and what we might 
anticipate—nations trade slaves taken from the wars, kings marry for political alliance, fevers 
decimate populations already weakened by famine, and the divide between the common people 
and those of royal blood has its advantages and disadvantages for both sides. Women in Glome 
die in childbirth, and if they survive, they “splay out” and lose their figures (TWHF 13, 232). 
Palace intrigue is a problem in Glome, and Orual, once Queen, cleans up the palace, hanging 
taletellers like old Batta, and rewarding the good servants. Further, the king is rightly disturbed 
when he discovers that the priest has held a secret meeting with the people—normally all 
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assemblies are called only by the King—and this is political decorum that we would expect for 
this time in history (TWHF 44).  
In this text, Lewis often places realism of presentation and of content adjacent to each 
other. For instance, Orual, as a girl, leans on her windowsill to dry her hair (presentation), and 
then overhears the King voice his dissatisfaction with the political marriage alliance he has made 
(content) (TWHF 13). Also, while the people are harassed by the burden of the famine and 
fevers, they seek a solution in any way they can, including the demand that beautiful, goddess-
like Psyche come and heal them (content), so Psyche goes out of the cool, palace darkness “into 
the hot, pestilential glare of that day” (presentation) (TWHF 27). All, the people of royal blood 
along with the commoners, are lacking in food from the famine (content), and Orual notes that in 
the palace all they have is “leeks and bean-bread and small beer” (presentation).  
 Lest we mistakenly think that Lewis confines his realism to Part I alone, a few examples 
from the visionary Part II should be mentioned. Even amid her dreams, Orual continues with her 
vivid account of detail. In the vision of the golden-fleeced rams, Orual takes time to record the 
setting: “There was deep, blue sky above them, and the grass was a luminous green like emerald, 
and there was a pool of very dark shadow, clear-edged, under every tree. The air of that country 
was sweet as music” (TWHF 283). Orual knows that she is nearing death (she describes her body 
with her “hanging dugs and shriveled flanks”), yet she is still much aware of things in the 
palace—the others do not realize that she knows that a message has been sent to her successor, 
her nephew Daaran (TWHF 258, 253). She describes meeting the eunuch Tarin, a fat man “all 
shining and reeking with oil, and tricked out with as much doll-finery as one of Ungit’s girls” 
(TWHF 254). Then, in her meeting with Bardia’s widow Ansit, there is a brief moment of 
softness and understanding between them that Orual compares to the moment of laughter on a 
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battlefield when “a sudden gust of wind” whips cloaks and the killing is paused for a moment 
(TWHF 263). Even as she sorts through things that her reason can barely hold, Orual maintains 
her rational description, her attention to detail, and her focus on the concrete. Realism of 
presentation continues even amid the fantastic and otherworldly dreams and visions. Orual’s 
outer life grows less a focus (what made up the realism of content in Part I) and her inner world 
begins to awaken, forcing a dormant imagination to attempt the grasp of the unearthly Realities 
being thrust upon her.  
 However, the novel’s realism is not seamless—and the breaks in realism reveal the 
inadequacy of any attempt at solely rationalistic account. Orual strives for a logical, tight case 
against the gods, but she finds that her memory is at times inadequate and she is unable to know 
all things equally well. Orual laments at the beginning of Part II, “Memory, once waked, will 
play the tyrant.” She goes on, identifying how difficult the task turned out to be:  
I found I must set down (for I was speaking as before judges and must not lie) passions 
and thoughts of my own which I had clean forgotten. The past which I wrote down was 
not the past that I thought I had (all these years) been remembering. I did not, even when 
I had finished the book, see clearly many things that I see now. The change which the 
writing wrought in me (and of which I did not write) was only a beginning—only to 
prepare me for the god’s surgery. They used my own pen to probe my wound. (TWHF 
253-4) 
Periodically, her consciousness of time was not as exact as she would have liked. She says of the 
early years with Psyche, “the years, doubtless, went round then as now, but in my memory it 
seems to have been all springs and summers” (TWHF 22). Although she may not be able to see it 
at the time of writing, there is a hint here that soul time runs on a different timetable than what 
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we normally count as time.85 Then, when she attempts the writing of the pivotal chapter on 
which her “charge against the gods chiefly rests,” memory once again is unstable: “Yet it is hard 
to know perfectly what I was thinking while those huge, silent moments went past. By 
remembering it too often I have blurred the memory itself” (TWHF 117). Once Orual is 
separated from Psyche, she falls back more heavily on the use of her rational faculties. Yet, even 
in her attempt at a logical account, her struggle for a pure linear narrative is often broken up by 
her present complaints against the gods. During the famine they continue the sacrifice of beasts, 
trying to placate Ungit and get some sort of relief—Orual interjects here that “food for the gods 
must always be found somehow, even when the land starves” (TWHF 79). After Psyche is taken, 
Orual slips into a raving sleep. At this point, she again switches to present tense: “Now mark yet 
again the cruelty of the gods. There is no escape from them into sleep or madness, for they can 
pursue you into them with dreams” (TWHF 80). Without realizing, she is probing close to the 
true Reality with her broken narrative—the gods, if they be real, must be eternal and beyond her 
present reality—thus any speech about the gods must be in the present, for they reside not only in 
historical time, but in all possible times. If the gods were cruel to take Psyche away from her, 
then they are still cruel in the present, and must be eternally cruel.  
 After hearing the “sacred story” told by the priest in Essur, Orual is overcome with anger 
and a sense of injustice—the gods have told the story wrong, they have “spat” in her face (TWHF 
243). She determines to set the case right through the writing of her story. On the return trip, 
however, her keen observation breaks (on the way she detailed the reapers and the harvest fields 
accurately). Indignation is clouding her reason: “I can tell nothing of our journey back to Glome. 
There were seven or eight days of it, and we passed many notable places . . . But my eyes and 
                                                
85 The Greek word psyche means soul. In Apuleius Psyche becomes the allegorical equivalent of the soul seeking 
Love (Cupid). 
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ears were shut up” (TWHF 247). Emotion cannot be contained wholly by the intellect, and her 
anger again awakes her “old quarrel with the gods” (TWHF 244). This begins the process she 
must take before the unification of her divided nature can occur. In Part II, she warns her readers 
that the gods “so drenched” her mind with “seeings” that her ability to discern between dream 
and waking is reduced (TWHF 276). She cannot with any certainty assure her reader that her 
visions were “what men call real or what men call dream” (TWHF 277). Her questioning of 
established truth (that which many see is normally considered reality) is evidence of how far she 
is removed now from a solely rational focus: “But things that many see may have no taste or 
moment in them at all, and things that are shown only to one may be spears and water-spouts of 
truth from the very depth of truth” (TWHF 277). The final vision, however, she is careful to 
state, is “no dream”; she walked into it with her “eyes wide open” (TWHF 285). Her blindness is 
finally falling away, allowing her to see into Realities beyond the text of her own words, her own 
book. She reads her complaint before the judge—and through her own story she becomes 
transported into a Divine Myth larger than any words—she concludes that her rational account is 
“Only words, words; to be led out to battle against other words” (TWHF 308). 
 Yet, we must not forget that the majority of the text is filled with a mass of small, 
realistic details that build a world far more specific and real than anything Apuleius was 
attempting to do. The reader senses that these are the “sort of things that happen” given the 
immediate situation. When Orual demands an answer of Bardia concerning the riddle of 
Psyche’s invisible palace and her unknown lover, Bardia hesitates, “drawing little scratches in 
the earth” with “a pebble” and needs to be prompted before he speaks (TWHF 136). This detail 
presents the reader with the quandary of a powerful leader of soldiers, a man, who, nevertheless, 
is under the authority of a woman of royal blood, all in a single descriptive line. Lewis is putting 
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into practice the advice he sent to Arthur C. Clarke that “all material should be used” in a work 
of art (CL III 412).86 He continues in the letter, applying the dictum to fiction, “If you write a 
historical novel, the period must be essential to the effect . . . What’s the excuse for locating 
one’s story on Mars unless ‘Martianity’ is through & through used.” The note he places at the 
bottom concerning this clause of the letter reads: “Emotionally & atmospherically as well as 
logically” (CL III 412). While Lewis uses both types of realism to establish his historical setting, 
realism of content may be most significant in making readers place the novel into the genre of 
historical fiction. Realism of content makes the novel work “logically” and fit into the rational 
mind’s categories. Presentational realism throughout the text, but especially important to 
establish the vivid details amid Orual’s strange visions in Part II, contributes to the atmosphere 
of the text. Lewis is trying to engage the imagination as well as the intellect. Scholars have had 
difficulty classifying this work because they are ignoring Lewis’s own ideas about realism. In 
one sense, it is realistic historical fiction, but as one writer has pointed out, historical fiction 
generally includes some recognizable figure or prominent place—here Greece is a minor factor 
in the story, and traditional figures are missing (Myers, Bareface 5-6).87 Ian Storey insists that 
the text is a “novel masquerading as historical fiction” reading the time and place indicators as 
“uncertain” and finding “no historical figures” (“Classical” 6). The presence of the dreams and 
visions and the lessening of content realism in Part II has made a label of “historical fiction” 
inadequate. Likewise, those who focus on the modernistic elements (specifically the 
                                                
86 January 20, 1954. 
87 Myers, however, does qualify her statement and considers Till We Have Faces as a realistic historical novel—the 
historical event she chooses to connect the text with is the “Incarnation, the historical birth of Jesus Christ” 
(Bareface 6). If one were to approach the book without a Christianized viewpoint, this would be difficult to argue. 
Lewis may indeed have intended the god in the story to be a pre-Incarnate version of Christ, but the text is not 
connected directly to the birth of Christ as a historical event, and one could conceivably make a case against 
equating the god of the Mountain with Christ.  
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psychological components) are ready to label this as a modern novel (Radmacher, Gibbons, 
Honda).88  
 The confusing (at least in a genre sense) of various kinds of realism combined with the 
fantastic, otherworldly Realities intruding into the text, makes this story hard to place. A 
comparison from the text itself may illustrate this complexity of definition. In one of her visions, 
Orual carries an empty bowl, journeying to the deadlands seeking the water of death. The bowl is 
actually her book of complaint, Part I of the text we have. This narrative, as long as it is viewed 
solely through a rationalistic focus, remains empty—Orual cannot receive the Divine Realities 
hidden in the text until she accepts the emptiness of her words. In a similar way, Lewis is using 
the text as a whole as a bowl filled with Divine Myth. The degree to which the poetry of his 
central idea seeps through and fills the reader may depend on the reader himself. Thus, 
classifications may vary simply based on each individual’s level of receptivity to the “kappa 
element,” or the “something else” within the text. This paper seeks to illuminate and participate 
in these tensions by placing the text directly into Lewis’s conception of Story, a linear narrative 
that serves as a container for a non-linear Myth. As such, perhaps Lewis only asks that we enjoy 
the narrative, suspend our rational beliefs, and enter into the story imaginatively. 
Gilbert Meilaender, in his article “Theology in Stories: C.S. Lewis and the Narrative 
Quality of Experience,” ties Lewis’s work on story with Stephen Crites’s ideas about the natural 
sequencing of linear narrative in the human experience of life. Meilaender notes that humans 
constantly seek “lasting refreshment” in something that is immune to the “corrosive powers of 
time” (149).89 Meilaender concludes that myth allows an experience of the timeless, something 
                                                
88 See the earlier summary of classifications of the text. 
89 Meilaender opens his argument with a quote from The Voyage of the Dawn Treader (“Theology” 147): Lucy 
comes to a spell in the wizard’s book labeled “for the refreshment of the spirit” (VDT 134). The spell is really a 
story, lovely while being read, and forgotten afterwards, but which becomes the standard for all subsequent stories 
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that cannot exist within abstract reasoning, but also qualifies this with Lewis’s notions of Story 
(“Theology” 149). While myth only “temporarily eclipses” the “gap between time and eternity,” 
narrative allows humans to taste the mythic realm while still residing in time (“Theology” 156). 
Meilaender, however, does not apply these ideas to any of Lewis’s fiction—his focus is on the 
use of narrative to convey theological truths. Mara Donaldson, however, does apply these ideas 
to Till We Have Faces in her article “Orual’s Story and the Art of Retelling.” Donaldson calls 
Till We Have Faces “a story about the nature and importance of story,” and divides her analysis 
of the text among three stories: Orual’s retelling, Psyche’s explanation on the mountain, and the 
priest in Essur’s ritual story (157, 159-161). She contrasts Orual’s linear narrative both with 
Psyche’s tale of personal experience, and with the priest’s ritual story based on the seasonal 
cycles of nature (“Orual” 168-9). Donaldson’s ideas about temporality in narrative apply here, 
but less so her discussion on Lewis’s ideas about narrative as Logos (“made thing”) and Poiema 
(the “activity of making”).90 
Before we look closer at Orual’s story, a further look at some of Stephen Crites’s ideas is 
needed. In the words of Crites, Orual’s complaint is an example of a mundane story, a human 
attempt to put a sacred story into words (“Narrative” 296).91 Orual disputes with the “sacred 
story” told by the priest in Essur, and decides to move the “sacred” into a more precise and 
truthful account based on her life perspective. Crites’s definition of a sacred story is “a story 
                                                                                                                                                       
Lucy reads. All Lucy remembers is that “It was about a cup and a sword and a tree and a green hill” (VDT 135). 
Lucy has stumbled upon one of Lewis’s ideal Stories—she remembers the concrete objects in the story (likely 
described in the solidarity of the senses with presentational realism) and the lovely feeling that she received from the 
atmosphere as a whole (a Myth is conveyed). 
90 However, the terms Logos and Poiema can easily be applied to the focus here on story and myth. Donaldson gets 
these terms from An Experiment in Criticism, and they appear to be another way to express the myth/story ideas 
Lewis presented in the chapter “On Myth.” Donaldson does not emphasize this aspect of Lewis’s ideas here, but for 
the purposes of this paper note that Lewis calls Poiema the “non-literary and non-verbal” component (like Lewis’s 
myth) that arouses “imaginations, emotions and thoughts” within the reader (EIC 136). Poiema begins in the Logos 
and cannot exist without it (the words convey the non-literary component). 
91 Crites is using the term “mundane” in the sense of mundus, an earthy story. 
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within the story,” a text that does not reside in words, but can live in ritual and sometimes in 
poetry (“Narrative” 295). According to Crites, a sacred story (or what this paper calls Divine 
Myth) is “not like monuments that men behold, but like dwelling-places,” a story that men can 
awake to, but can never invent on their own (“Narrative” 295, 296). Similar to Lewis’s tension 
between the plot and the theme in story, Crites speaks of human existence as a constant 
mediation between mundane and sacred stories, a reality of existence that can only be contained 
in narrative (“Narrative” 298). Crites ends his argument with two issues facing narrative in the 
modern world—issues that connect with Lewis’s divergent ways in The Pilgrim’s Regress 
(Meilaender 152). The first, Crites’s “strategy of abstraction,” is a reduction of life into non-
narrative, “atemporal,” rational generalities (“Narrative” 308); this strategy is important for 
science and corresponds, according to Meilaender, with the “arid,” “sterile” Northern way in 
Lewis’s allegory (“Theology” 153). The second, the “strategy of contraction,” focuses on the 
experience of the body in a fragmented, temporal narrative—moments in time, instant 
experiences of isolated images and sensations that are thought to embody the “concrete” 
(“Narrative” 309). This is Lewis’s Southern way, where thought is restricted to the immediate 
moment of gratification of the body (Meilaender 153). Again, we are faced with the dilemma of 
division, and Crites, like Lewis, seeks a resolution of the fragmented self through narrative 
(“Narrative” 309). Donaldson believes that Orual writes two books, the second of which 
“deconstructs” the first. The writing of both parts, however, allows her to gain knowledge about 
her divided self and about the gods, the writing acting as a means of transformation as the gods 
are made “accessible” and “mediated by her story” (“Orual” 162). The final section of this paper 
will examine how story mediates transformation in the life of Orual. 
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Chapter 5: Story as Transformation 
Orual: A Divided Life 
 
Lewis may have called the hero of The Pilgrim’s Regress “John” in an attempt at a generic 
“everyman” figure, but Orual in Till We Have Faces, with her skeptical mind, is a successful 
portrait of modern humanity.92 She lives a divided life, insisting on a scientific approach to 
history, but to do so, she finds that she must bury part of her being. This way of living works, 
and she becomes an active, powerful, and just queen. Arnom, the younger priest, writes a tribute 
to her at the end of her text: “This book was all written by Queen Orual of Glome, who was the 
most wise, just, valiant, fortunate and merciful of all princes known in our parts of the world” 
(TWHF 308-9). In her personal life, however, she increasingly finds only emptiness. The things 
she cannot fit into her rationalistic philosophy trouble her. Near the end, she finds that even 
language breaks down, failing her in her attempt at a pure account of her own history. Orual is 
bothered by other accounts—like that of Psyche, Tarin, and Ansit—that do not fit with her own 
memory of the events. Her degree of self-knowledge is based directly on her level of receptivity 
to the things hidden within her own text—this renewal and transformation of the self directly 
results from her participation in her own story.  
 There are three basic concepts that Orual cannot fit comfortably into her view of the 
world: the traditional worship of Ungit in the city of Glome with all its contradictions and 
strange, repellent practices; the concept of sacrifice, both within the worship structure she grows 
                                                
92 Mark Edwards contrasts the names Psyche (soul) with Orual, and suggests that the name “Orual” may be an 
“emblem of the body” in opposition to the soul (“Classicist” 68). Others suggest that Lewis got the name from a 
French herb. Doreen Wood notes that Orual may be a “written variant of Orval, a French name for the herb Salvia 
Clerea. A book of herbs from 1658 called it, “Orval, a certain herb otherwise called Clary or Clear-eye.” It was 
sometimes translated Godes-eie and See-bright (Vol. VII, p.211)” (“Pattern” 84). This would suggest that Lewis 
intends Orual to be clear-sighted in spiritual things, which is not the case for the majority of the book, but she 
becomes this way when she begins to be receptive of Divine Myth.  
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up in and beyond as a general principle of religion; and finally the gods themselves, their silence, 
their riddles, and their elusiveness, resisting containment in any tidy rational structures. As a 
child, Orual is frightened of the old priest; she dislikes the smell of blood and “burnt fat and 
singed hair and wine and stale incense” that hang about him, a smell Orual comes to associate 
with “holiness” (TWHF 11). His clothes only added to her terror, the skins and “dried bladders” 
and the awful bird mask (TWHF 11). Later, after the fever, the priest himself looks “like a 
vulture” (TWHF 45). The image of the old priest recalls Lewis’s description of History in The 
Pilgrim’s Regress, an old man with “a pale, bird-like face” (177). History functions as a guide 
for John, edging him closer to the true path through his explanation of desire and the long years 
of pictures sent by a kind Landlord, giving messages to the people living in Pagus. Perhaps the 
old priest could have instructed Orual in a similar fashion, but she will not condescend to ask it 
of him.93 Orual wants to think of the old priest as “a mere schemer and a politic,” but she 
struggles to maintain that view when she witnesses the priest’s responses (TWHF 54). The priest 
shows no terror at an angry King Thom who has just lost his queen and gained another girl baby, 
nor does he fear the king later in the Pillar Room when a dagger is thrust against his ribs (TWHF 
15, 53). All Orual sees is calm confidence, the priest is “sure of Ungit.” This experience disturbs 
Orual with a sense of otherness: “The room,” she says, “was full of spirits, and the horror of 
holiness” (TWHF 54).  
 The whole system of Ungit worship is repulsive to Orual. She finds the temple oppressive 
and describes it as a dark, “imprisoning, smothering sort of place” (TWHF 269). The rite of the 
Year’s birth is one example of repulsive ritual practice. Orual thought of it in terms of excessive 
                                                
93 The character History, however, is not frightening in the same way as the old priest excites terror. John finds the 
old man, History, a hermit in a little cave. He initially describes History as “so old and thin that his hands were 
transparent and John thought that a little wind would have blown him away” (PR 164). The hermit is kind, feeds 
him, gives him a place to sleep, and readily answers John’s questions. 
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slaughter, mentioning the waste of wine and blood poured out through the night (TWHF 269). 
The temple eats up valuable funds, people, and animals, draining the life out of Glome. For 
example, the temple girls become barren after a few seasons and slowly turn into the “toothless 
crones” who sweep and tend the fires (TWHF 269). Ungit devours and no good seems to come of 
it: “I thought how the seed of men that might have gone to make hardy boys and fruitful girls 
was drained into that house, and nothing given back; how the silver that men had earned hard 
and needed was also drained in there, and nothing given back; and how the girls themselves were 
devoured and were given nothing back” (TWHF 269-70). Orual is disgusted at the amount of 
slaughter at other times as well: before the King’s wedding the courtyard is full of the slaughter 
(TWHF 10), the King’s hope for a son demands a monthly killing of beasts (TWHF 13), and 
despite the famine, Ungit still must have her due in ritual sacrifice (TWHF 79). She also cannot 
get to the business of fighting Argan until the gods “have their bit” and the bull is sacrificed 
(TWHF 217). As queen, Orual is most “irked” by her duties associated with the temple (TWHF 
233-4).  
 Sacrifice troubles Orual—it seems counterproductive and destructive. There comes a 
point when Ungit is not even satisfied with “bulls and rams and goats” and needs the life of a 
man or woman instead (TWHF 45). The lot falls on Psyche, who the commoners have taken to 
calling “the Accursed”; she is the one who will be sacrificed in the “Great Offering” to appease 
the Brute (TWHF 47). Orual is horrified, and refuses to call it “sacrifice,” to her it is “murder” 
instead (TWHF 71, 77). Other times she simply cannot say the word. In a conversation with the 
Fox, Orual asks about the efficacy of the “Great Offering” but finds that she cannot give the 
sacrifice a name and breaks off speaking instead (TWHF 84). If any other kind of sacrifice has no 
effect, why should the offering of a human life do anything? She begins to view her own people, 
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especially in regard to religious practice, as barbarians. After finding Psyche alive and well on 
the mountain after the sacrifice, yet bothered by what kind of being visits Psyche at night, Orual 
attempts to speak to the gods directly. Her boldness to go outside of protocol shows her distaste 
for the whole system—she speaks to the gods outside of ritual, “not in a temple, and without a 
sacrifice” (TWHF 150). Her aversion to sacrifice shows up again near the end of her life on the 
trip to Essur. The temple in Essur seems to be an improvement over what she is used to; this one 
is clean and empty and has “none of the common temple smells about it” (TWHF 240).94 Kilby 
has pointed out that blood sacrifice is lacking in this temple. If there is any sacrifice here, it is in 
the style of Cain—flowers and fruit (“TWHF” 179). Orual is intrigued, and starts asking 
questions. The priest here begins telling her the “sacred story,” which she soon finds echoes her 
own life. Schakel has correctly noted that Orual interrupts the story right when the priest would 
have said the word “sacrifice”—she cannot accept it as a part of religious ritual, and wishes to 
purge the idea from her own story as well (“TWHF” 287, TWHF 246).95  
 Mixed up in all the horror of ritual and sacrifice are the Beings hovering behind. Orual’s 
rejection of the rituals is based on her doubts and uncertainties about the gods. She shares the 
Fox’s basic confusion at the words of the old priest; everything the blind man says seems to be 
contradictory. The Brute, the being Psyche must be offered to, is described first as a monster, 
then as a shadow, then as a goddess, and finally as a god (TWHF 47-48). It is all “in a mystery” 
says the priest; the awful Brute is “Ungit herself, or Ungit’s son, the god of the mountain; or 
both” (TWHF 48). If a man is offered, he becomes Ungit’s husband; a woman becomes the bride 
                                                
94 Note that at this point, Orual has not truly sacrificed anything of herself yet. The god tells her to “die before you 
die,” and she learns of a kind of spiritual, soul death in Part II of the narrative (TWHF 279). Orual knows only 
words, and has not lived as a whole person—she has excluded the need for blood sacrifice both literally and 
figuratively in her life. According to Ansit, she has done something more horrible, “drank up” the “blood” of the 
lives of her people; her people have sacrificed for her (TWHF 265). 
95 Schakel also notes that sacrifice is not central to The Pilgrim’s Regress. He argues that sacrifice is tied up with 
imagination and myth, and both of these are weaker in Lewis’s allegory than in the text of Till We Have Faces 
(Reason 122). 
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of Ungit’s son. Another paradox is the loving and devouring motif—those who are offered 
become married to the goddess/god, but they are also eaten (TWHF 49). The Fox objects, unable 
to comprehend that the one sacrificed can be both perfect and wicked, both beautiful and the 
cause of impurity in the land (TWHF 49-50). In the conversation between Orual and Psyche 
before the “Great Offering,” Orual calls the god “a worm, or a giant eft, or a spectre,” and views 
Psyche as his prey (TWHF 72). Psyche, however, focuses on being his bride and tries to explain 
to Orual that there may not be much difference between marriage and being eaten—she 
understands something about death that Orual cannot grasp (TWHF 72). For Orual, any god who 
demands human sacrifice must be “viler than the vilest men” (TWHF 71).  
 Orual persists in her belief about the cruelty of the gods, and though she may live as if 
they are not present, she still blames them for all her sufferings. She finds that she cannot escape 
them, not even while asleep or in madness (TWHF 81). They tempt her to think of delight even 
when she knows she should be stern, hard, and sober. On the way to gather the remains of 
Psyche she steps outside of her account and criticizes the gods, “We are their bubbles; they blow 
us big before they prick us” (TWHF 97). She asks for an answer, and receives only a riddle: is 
the palace real or not? To Orual, this is “divine mockery”—the riddle cannot be tested, and 
resides outside of all rational proofs (TWHF 134). Orual is demanding clarity and certainty, and 
thus attributes their silence to what must be their malignant natures. Instead of an answer, they 
send rain (TWHF 125). Rosemary Wright, in her dissertation tracing Biblical allusions in the text 
of Till We Have Faces, correctly calls rain a direct sign from the gods, showing their care and 
concern—Orual however, is unable to read the sign properly, and blames them for their lack of 
answer (“Biblical” 39-48).96 For her, the gods are unfair, they “hint and hover,” and “whisper 
                                                
96 Wright notes the following examples of rain as signs from the gods: the rain Orual hears on the roof when she 
wakes from her raving sleep after Psyche has been offered (TWHF 82), the rain Orual meets going up the mountain 
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(words we cannot understand)” whenever we wish to be alone, and then “vanish,” and stay silent 
when we actually seek them (TWHF 249). She concludes that it is all a cruel game. Nothing 
seems logical—holiness is all tied up with darkness, and all “sacred matters” are filled with 
contradictions.97 Orual’s explanation of the rite of the Year’s birth applies to all the things sacred 
in their essential paradoxes: “it is and it is not” (TWHF 268).  
 Orual decides she must remain true to her reason and chooses to avoid the inconvenient 
contradictions that she cannot resolve. She eluded the idea of sacrifice through a linguistic twist, 
renaming it as “murder” and not allowing others to speak of it. She does similar things to escape 
the acceptance of the temple practices and believing in the gods themselves. Orual relies heavily 
on the Fox’s philosophy, but at first it is not a complete reliance, as she at times questions his 
ways. He is quick to respond to hints of the supernatural with “It’s only lies of poets, lies of 
poets, child. Not in accordance to nature” (TWHF 8). Orual, however, notices the “lilt” in his 
voice and the “brightness” of his eyes when he slips into reciting myth or poetry (TWHF 9). 
When Glome’s fortunes suddenly shift after the offering of Psyche, Orual asks the Fox what he 
now thinks of Ungit. The Fox calls it all a “cursed chance” that happens at times to “nourish the 
beliefs of barbarians” (TWHF 85). According to Myers, Orual is continually trying to decide 
whether to believe in supernatural or in natural causation (Bareface 27). The Fox’s philosophy 
focuses on the “god within” using reason and self-discipline; his doctrine is “clear, hard, limited, 
and simple” (TWHF 303). Orual loves to learn, and enjoys her lessons with the Fox. Despite her 
doubts about the depth of his philosophy, she eventually makes a choice, and subscribes more 
                                                                                                                                                       
the first time (TWHF 93), the rain while she speaks with Psyche in the valley (TWHF 125), and also the rain after 
Orual’s prayer (TWHF 150) (“Biblical” 39-48). 
97 Mara Donaldson, in her book Holy Places are Dark Places: C. S. Lewis and Paul Ricoeur on Narrative 
Transformation, examines the various meanings of “darkness” in the metaphor “holy places are dark places” from 
Till We Have Faces (72-76). Donaldson presents how the old priest, the Fox and Orual all approach “darkness” in 
different ways. 
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deeply to the Fox’s ways after the banishment of Psyche. At this time, Orual says, “I wanted hard 
things now, and to pile up knowledge” (TWHF 184). To anyone looking on, it might look like 
prudence on her part, a way to prepare for Queenship, but Orual knows inside that she is 
primarily fortifying her mind against the gods. 
 In respect to the temple practices, she supports the young priest, Arnom, who also has 
come under the Fox’s influence. Orual finds this priest safer—no holy darkness and no Ungit 
smell clings to him—and as queen she negotiates a closer political alliance with the temple than 
her father ever achieved (TWHF 205). Even the temple itself becomes cleaner and new windows 
expose the Ungit stone within. Orual decides that Ungit is “now weakened” and there is less to 
fear from her (TWHF 234). As a wealthy queen, she provides Arnom with silver to set up a new 
goddess, craved in a woman’s form after the Greek tradition. She wonders about her motivation, 
but decides it is only an attempt to “defeat” “the old, hungry, faceless Ungit” who terrified her 
during childhood (TWHF 234). The old Ungit is a shapeless, faceless stone, which originated 
from the deep earth’s “dark and weight and heat” (TWHF 270).98 Arnom talks about Ungit as if 
she is only a symbol of the earth; a signifier removed so far from the sign, so far from the Real 
god behind, that there is no risk of intrusion. Arnom’s clear rational abstraction separates him 
from the old priest’s experience of holiness.  
                                                
98 Lewis’s letter to Jocelyn Gibb on April 11, 1956, concerning the pictorial wrapper on the book, gives us a good 
idea of the contrast between the two goddesses (CL III 735-6). He uses the word “πέρας” (“limit”) to represent the 
statue of Aphrodite, and the phrase “τὸ ἄπειρον” (“boundlessness”) to represent the stone Ungit. He further explains 
the two ideas through a chart. Ungit is to be a “living rock,” “old,” and “barbarous.” Her form is “sexy,” “ugly,” 
“indefinite,” and “suggestive of life.” Aphrodite, however, is made of “cut stone,” a new image, which belongs to 
the “civilized” world. The statue is sexy “only in the sense of trying to be pretty.” The Aphrodite statue has a 
“definite,” “rigid” form, that looks “dead as a Dutch doll” (CL III 736). Lewis may have also been thinking about 
the distinction between the heavenly Venus and the earthly Venus. In the text of Apuleius, Venus is at times in her 
heavenly aspect (Venus Caelestis), but most often in earthly form (Venus Vulgaris) (Kenney 19-20). This tradition is 
detailed in Plato’s Symposium (180d2 – 181b8). Lewis differentiates between the two goddesses in other places; for 
example, see Lewis’s English Literature in the Sixteenth Century (375). A case could be made presenting Ungit as 
the Venus of the people (Vulgaris) and Aphrodite as the heavenly Venus. 
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 Orual finds, nonetheless, that the gods do intrude; like pesky flies, they come when they 
are not wanted. Yet, since they do not fit comfortably into her naturalistic view of the world, 
Orual still attempts to avoid them. While remembering the sacrifice of Psyche, she outlines her 
strategy: “The nearest thing we have to a defence against them (but there is no real defence) is to 
be very wide awake and sober and hard at work, to hear no music, never to look at earth or sky, 
and (above all) to love no one” (TWHF 80-1). To varying degrees, she is successful. On the trip 
up the mountain, she is confronted with nature, the “huge world” begins putting “mad ideas” into 
her heart, and she wonders if all her anger is misplaced. The very “heart” of the world seems to 
be dancing, and it pulls her in, tempting her to set aside her sadness and dance as well (TWHF 
96). The beauty of the world speaks the language of Myth, drawing her away from common 
sense. Orual, however, decides that “reason called for” an avoidance of laughter in one who is 
going to bury the bones of her sister (TWHF 97). Her reason cannot receive the new “mad 
ideas,” and must persist in what she already knows: Psyche is dead. So she makes a decision on 
the side of reason: “I ruled myself” (TWHF 97). What follows is a series of choices supporting 
the reason and barring all imaginative influence. She ignores the hints the gods send—the rain, 
the glimpse of the strange palace, and the beauty of nature. She not only fortifies her mind with 
knowledge, but also hardens her body by pursuing a “hard and joyless” strength. She continues 
her fencing lessons with Bardia and later adds horseback riding, wanting the physical bodily 
discipline to “drive all the woman out” of her (TWHF 184). There are, at times, breaks in her 
armour. On windy, rainy nights, she sometimes grieves for Psyche and calls on the gods, but 
always, she says, “I would set to and rebuild the dam” as soon as possible afterwards (TWHF 
184). The reason dislikes things out of order, and if given absolute control, it will seek to build 
its own tiny kingdom, unmolested by any outer influences. Thus Orual, by the time she reads her 
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complaint before the judge, can say to the gods: “There’s no room for you and us in the same 
world. You’re a tree in whose shadow we can’t thrive. We want to be our own” (TWHF 291).99  
 This desire for absolute freedom and control within the reason, leads Orual to a string of 
actions that outwardly make her prosperous, but inwardly demolish her soul. The choice to wear 
the veil, although initially used to hide her outer identity, comes to strip her of an inner identity. 
She uses the veil as a “treaty” with her ugliness, a way to control something she really has no 
power over (TWHF 181). The veil aids her, giving her supremacy first over her father, and then 
over many others, visiting nobles and kings, and common people coming for justice and 
judgment (TWHF 182). The veil is an outer symbol of her inner burying of the self. She wants 
Orual to die, and bit by bit, her persona as Queen wins out (TWHF 211).100 “I locked Orual up,” 
she says, “or laid her asleep as best I could somewhere deep down inside me; she lay curled 
there. It was like being with child, but reversed; the thing I carried in me grew slowly smaller 
and less alive” (TWHF 226). Her reason cannot handle the emotions that bubble up when she 
hears the chains at the well swing in the wind; it sounds like Psyche weeping. The emotions 
belong to the buried Orual, the part still “refusing to die” (TWHF 229). Sharon Jebb notes that 
Lewis’s use of parentheses in this passage illustrates how the rational Queen treats the inner 
Orual: “the old Orual is walled off, buried alive, but still—somewhere—present” (118). Orual 
physically walls in the well, but finds the sound still exists—the weeping of Psyche is interior to 
her life, and it cannot be removed by any outer action. She finds that the sound follows her into 
dreams, and in dreams, she sees that she has “gagged with stone, not a well but Psyche (or Orual) 
                                                
99 Thomas Howard, in his article “Till We Have Faces: the Uttermost Farthing,” presents the demand for freedom as 
the main emphasis of Till We Have Faces. Howard places Orual’s demands for freedom on her own terms as the 
main reason she cannot experience the gods (“TWHF” 159). This may be part of the picture, but not the whole. 
Orual did not set out to demand her freedom, but came to that way of living through her early choices to favour 
rational analysis over imaginative experience.  
100 Lewis uses the title “Queen” in the later section of Part I to signify Orual’s surface persona. “Queen” will be 
capitalized to signify this outer identity that wars with the inner “Orual.” 
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herself” (TWHF 235). Then the sound disappears, and she defeats Essur a year later (TWHF 
235). The juxtaposition of these ideas should not be a surprise, her reason is simply conquering 
more territory in her mind and soul, and this control passes into her exterior persona of the 
Queen. Inner control gains her greater political power. Yet, her outer success is no indication of 
the inner life and health of her soul.  
 All the memories of Psyche, all her pain, and her anger at the gods—these reside in her 
inner soul, in Orual. If she can make the inner Orual “vanish” within the Queen, she will gain 
reason’s goal: “the gods would almost be cheated” (TWHF 201). Behind the veil, and walled up, 
Orual does vanish, and her strength as the Queen increases. Hiding her weakness emphasizes 
other strengths—for instance, the beauty of her voice is suddenly noticed, and the shape of her 
virginal figure feeds fantasies about her possible beauty of face (TWHF 228, 232). The stories 
that begin to circulate about her face are more revealing than the Queen realizes. Some say her 
face is “frightful beyond endurance,” or that it is really an animal face hidden beneath the white 
cloth. However, the best story, she remembers, is the one about a lack of face, the terror of 
“emptiness” behind her veil (TWHF 228). Why does the story of an absence become her 
favourite? Why not the story that suggests her face might contain “dazzling” beauty instead? 
Perhaps the Queen somehow senses the truth that behind her veil, behind the Queenship, there 
really is nothing there. Perhaps she thinks that nothingness is better than ugliness, and she can 
gloat in her victory over the weak Orual. Still, she ultimately finds the actions and power of her 
Queenship empty, lamenting at the end, “I did and I did and I did—and what does it matter what 
I did?” (TWHF 236). The end of each day brought her out of Queenship and back to aloneness 
with herself—but here she finds only “a nothingness,” she has no self left (TWHF 236). Her 
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insistence on a purely rational life has drained everything away, and there is only a negation, a 
vast emptiness behind her veil. Orual discovers that the soul cannot live on reason alone.  
 Orual’s limited viewpoint is further exposed through her interactions with Psyche, the 
night before the offering, and then later on the mountain. Psyche is receptive to the old priest; 
she is open to other alternatives in ways that Orual is not. Although she appreciates all the Fox 
taught her, she realizes it is incomplete. The night in the prison room she tries to explain it to 
Orual: “[The Fox] calls the whole world a city. But what’s a city built on? There’s earth beneath. 
And outside the wall? Doesn’t all the food come from there as well as all the dangers? . . . things 
growing and rotting, strengthening and poisoning, things shining wet . . . in one way (I don’t 
know which way) more like, yes, even more like the House of—”  (TWHF 70-71). Orual 
shudders and provides the name “Ungit.”101 Psyche is having trouble speaking because she is 
suggesting things she experiences with her imagination. Here is Lewis’s Demeter again, warm, 
dark, and fertile, providing life. Psyche cannot fully share Orual’s belief that the gods are vile, 
monstrous, and cruel. Maybe, offers Psyche, the gods do not do horrible things, or maybe it is 
only our perspective that is skewed—maybe we would change our assumptions if we could see 
more of their Reality (TWHF 71). She readily admits that there are things beyond understanding, 
but she is able to balance the contradictions, open to the possibility that being devoured and 
married to the god may both occur, and might even be the same event (TWHF 71). 
Psyche also has a different opinion about sacrifice. While alone on the mountain, tied to 
the Tree, one thing supports her mind. She finds the thing hard to put into words, but she says it 
                                                
101 Kilby notes that Psyche never mentions the name of Ungit directly (Images 135). Yet, she is receptive to the old 
priest’s teachings, and allows room for Ungit-like ideas and imagery. Whether her silence about Ungit herself has 
any significance (Kilby ties it into his theological argument that Lewis is producing a pre-Christian text with 
Christian themes), it cannot be argued that Psyche is wholly rejecting Glome’s religious practice. Perhaps Psyche is 
like the devout heathen in The Last Battle who lives his life a sincere worshiper of Tash, yet is welcomed into the 
heavenly Narnia by Aslan. 
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contained philosophy, the Fox’s ideas about the “gods or ‘the divine nature,’” and ideas from the 
priest, things “about the blood and the earth and how sacrifice makes the crops grow” (TWHF 
109-10). Her receptivity helps Psyche merge ideas, or at least hold them parallel, and gain 
strength Orual has never experienced. It is significant that when Psyche is able to do this, the 
weather changes, and the rain Glome so needs, arrives. Psyche now knows “that the gods really 
are,” and that her sacrifice will help her people (TWHF 110). She, not Orual, experienced the 
“longing—to reach the Mountain, to find the place where all the beauty came from,” and she is 
willing to meet the god, even if it means the sacrifice of all she has ever known (TWHF 75-76). 
Psyche knows that there is something Beyond, and it is worth seeking. Her imaginative openness 
leads her to Divine Myth, beginning first in vague longings, then through the teachings of the 
Fox and the old priest, and finally through direct experience. 
Orual may have reasoned away the absurd invitation of the beauty of the world, calling 
her heart to dance; Psyche does not. Psyche does not understand Orual’s worry about “doing” 
things—just “be merry” she says, and then asks, “Why should our hearts not dance? (TWHF 
105). Psyche is practiced in noticing and embracing beauty. She remembers childhood days in 
the hills looking at the beauty, enjoying “the colour and the smell” of nature (TWHF 74). Now, 
Orual finds Psyche strong and beautiful but in rags. Orual cannot fit all these earthly realities 
together, because she cannot see the Divine Reality that Psyche does. Psyche has a “soul-house” 
now, and a certainty that resembles that of the priest, certain about Ungit, unafraid of the dagger 
between his ribs (TWHF 120). Orual sees Psyche, but not the palace, nor the food nor the wine 
she is given. Orual has allowed reason to shut down a door in her mind. The glimpse of the 
palace in the fog, and the voice of the god later, she pushes aside. Reason alone cannot contain 
belief.  
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Finally, like any good scientist, she seeks verification. On her next trip to see Psyche, she 
demands that Psyche test and prove the theory. Orual believes that the being that visits Psyche at 
night is hideous, even if she permits the idea that he is divine. She asks Psyche, “What sort of 
god would he be who dares not show his face?” (TWHF 159). The beautiful do not hide their 
faces, she reasons. Psyche may not have physical sight of her lover, but she has the knowledge of 
a bride, data that goes beyond Orual’s limited experience and imagination. Orual is convinced 
that Psyche is “afraid of the test” (TWHF 163). Since Orual knows that she cannot “test” the 
image of the palace she briefly saw in the fog, she selfishly uses Psyche to run another sort of 
test. Orual tries reasoning with Psyche, but finds she cannot reach Psyche’s mind—Psyche 
speaks a different language (TWHF 128). So she resorts to the “mercenary army” of the passions, 
using violence to threaten Psyche into submission (TWHF 178). Psyche is asked to take a lamp 
into her chamber and use her physical, mortal eyes to observe the god. Orual is convinced that 
the sight will “cure” Psyche, and bring her running back to Orual’s side, weeping (TWHF 123, 
169). Psyche performs the test, but the consequences are not those included in Orual’s 
hypothesis. She has left out an important variable (the gods themselves and their decrees), 
limited her possibilities (the gods cannot be beautiful), and is thus surprised and terrified at the 
result. Psyche is sent into exile, and Orual is sentenced by the god, “You also shall be Psyche,” 
he says (TWHF 174). She has her answer; the test has indeed shown that the “gods are” part of 
reality, and so she returns home convinced that she is the object of their hatred (TWHF 175). 
Orual: Learning to Taste 
 
Once Orual has proven the terrible existence of the gods, she resigns herself to her fate, 
expecting at any moment to be sent into exile like Psyche or killed by the anger of the gods. 
Instead, she is given a long and prosperous life as a powerful queen. Her life, however, is marred 
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by a nagging emptiness inside and a persistent sense of the fundamental meaninglessness of life. 
Orual lives divided, and she is acutely aware of her diseased condition. Before urging Psyche to 
perform her test, Orual spends an anguished night, unable to “find out whether the doctrines of 
Glome or the wisdom of Greece were right” (TWHF 151). Are the gods real? Would they really 
ask sacrifice of us? Are there things too dark and deep to be seen clearly or framed in words? Or 
are words enough? Surely there is a natural explanation for all the strange happenings in the 
world. The two ways seem impossible to reconcile, and she aptly diagnoses her condition: “I saw 
that for years my life had been lived in two halves, never fitted together” (TWHF 151). Orual 
knows that Psyche is able to merge the two parts better than she can, and this knowledge fuels 
her jealousy.  
 Orual does not want to admit that the “chit of a girl” Psyche, might have a solution for 
her dividedness. Psyche understands that Orual does not need fixing or curing, but rather 
awakening. She attempts to initiate this transformation in Orual through the telling of her story. 
Psyche’s experience goes beyond words, but the use of story allows her to bring how she felt into 
words when alone before the West-wind god came (that deep strength from connecting reason 
and imagination), and how to describe the otherworldly beauty of her palace and that of her 
relationship with Cupid himself. The story is halting at times when she searches for the right 
words or analogies to convey her experience of Divine Reality to Orual. Orual, however, does 
not receive the story. She perceives herself wiser, more rational than Psyche, and thus sticks with 
her plans. She cannot receive the Demeter reality of blood and sacrifice and darkness, and she 
closes down her imagination.  
 There are other stories in the text. Orual cannot receive Psyche’s strange account because 
she earlier dismissed the old priest’s explanation of the sacred story and ritual surrounding the 
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“Great Offering.” His story is too horrifyingly close, suggesting things that will change her life 
and relationships irrevocably. Other stories are more distant, and Orual can stand back from them 
and rationally make use of their realities. For example, she is interested in the Fox’s escapes into 
myth and poetry. After the offering of Psyche, Orual remembers the stories of Iphigenia and 
Antigone she heard from the Fox. These stories spur her into action, and she determines that she 
will be another Antigone and go gather her sister’s bones (TWHF 86). Later, the sacred story 
from the priest in Essur also drives Orual to action.102 This priest tells the story using the words 
Lewis read in Apuleius, beginning with “Once upon a time in a certain land there lived a king 
and a queen who had three daughters, and the youngest was the most beautiful princess in the 
whole world . . .” (TWHF 241-2). Orual recognizes the story as her own, but twisted—she cannot 
receive the fact that the sisters were jealous, and begins picking the story apart, finding its errors. 
Just as she did with Psyche, she cannot listen, but instead continually interrupts the flow of the 
tale with her own questions and anger. Orual calls the Apuleius-style tale a “story belonging to a 
different world” (TWHF 243). In that world, the gods are visible to all and they openly commune 
with humans. Orual is convinced that if the world is really like that, if the gods would not “ask 
you to believe what contradicts your eyes and ears and nose and tongue and fingers,” then she 
would “have walked aright” (TWHF 244). Orual has lived her life longing for clarity; she is one 
of those individuals who “demand” to see everything “clearly, as if the gods were no more than 
letters written in a book” (TWHF 50). Her experience tells her that life is not clear like water, but 
she insists on living as if it is and then blames the gods for her dilemma.  
                                                
102 Note that Orual is proficient in “using” stories as opposed to “receiving.” Lewis uses these terms in An 
Experiment in Criticism to outline the basic difference between readers. Those who “use” a text do “things with the 
work” but do not allow the text to indiscriminately work on them (EIC 85). These stories push her into action, but 
she does not really receive them as they are. The stories act as mirrors instead of windows—Orual receives nothing 
new, they only reflect back what she already knows or believes. 
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 She may not have fully received the priest in Essur’s tale, but it does break open her 
anger and force her back into memory. On the ride home to Glome, her gaze moves into the 
emptiness of her internal life, “recalling every passage of the true story, dragging up terrors, 
humiliations, struggles, and anguish” that were hidden for years. She likens the process to 
digging the self “out of a grave, out of a walled well”—Orual, the real Orual, is again allowed to 
“wake and speak” (TWHF 247). She is “with book, as a woman is with child” (TWHF 247). 
Once home, she begins to write. During the process of “sifting and sorting” the past, she learns 
the limitations of rational analysis and of memory and begins to see her dividedness and her need 
for transformation. The gods use her “own pen to probe” the wound and begin surgery (TWHF 
254).103 
 Orual’s story leads her to see that both Athene and Demeter are needed; both the Fox’s 
clear thinking philosophy and the earthy, terrible Ungit are part of the human soul. She cannot be 
whole while excluding one part of her being. The ways of the old priest do not mesh easily with 
Greek thought, but both are needed. Psyche somehow learns to live with the tension between the 
two ways, and her constant balancing of the one way against and with the other gives her 
strength deeper than both can give alone. Psyche remembers that the Fox admits that there are 
other Greek masters “who have taught that death opens a door out of a little, dark room . . . into a 
great, real place where the true sun shines” (TWHF 73). She is receptive to new ideas, while 
Orual is not. During Orual’s writing, however, she begins to receive the dreams and visions that 
are detailed in Part II.104 Her story is opening up her imagination to receive the messages of the 
gods through the visions. Like the “pictures” sent to the inhabitants of Pagus in The Pilgrim’s 
                                                
103 See Lewis’s essay “A Note on Jane Austen.” Here he traces the changes in four of Austen’s characters, calling 
their process of gaining self-awareness an experience of “undeception” or “awakening” (SLE 177). 
104 Orual notes at the beginning of Part II that the change began while she was writing; yet, she did not write the 
details of her shift in thinking within the text itself. Once she completes her book (Part I), she decides that there is 
not time to “mend the book” so she adds to it (TWHF 253). 
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Regress, Orual is being offered another way to see Reality, even amid her story of “disunion and 
conflict” (Urang 43). 
 The problem of defining reality/Reality plagues Orual from the beginning. Does she 
really see the palace? Is reality only what the physical eyes can see? Bardia has no answer, 
saying noncommittally, “I don’t know what’s really, when it comes to houses of gods” (TWHF 
135). Then she asks the Fox if there might be such a thing as “soul-houses,” things that cannot be 
seen (TWHF 142). The Fox centers his answer on natural obstructions to sight—things can be 
too far away to see, or darkness can hinder sight. Yet, these obstructions can be tested or 
removed by human means. It is not hard to see how Orual reaches her decision that Psyche must 
test her lover with a lamp. For the scientific mind, all things can be solved and reality can be 
discerned, if only there is enough time, or materials, or means for observation. Orual learns, 
however, that there is a Reality beyond the earthly, testable matter. The gods appear to her, and 
speak, and there is, she says, no way to take a god’s voice for a mortal’s once you have heard 
that strange sound—“They are not to be mistaken” (TWHF 279). 
 Further, she learns what Psyche knew back in her prison room, that the Reality beyond 
might not be what we here perceive it to be. Orual originally believed that the gods must be 
horrible and ugly since they hide their faces. After the test with the lamp, Orual sees Cupid, in a 
lightning flash of beauty; her previously reasoned perception is suddenly overthrown with new 
sight (TWHF 173). Then, in the vision at the end of her life, she speaks again with the Fox, this 
time about justice. After her humbling rant, she is taken before the gods to be accused and now 
she despairs of receiving any mercy. The Fox strangely assures her that the gods are not just, 
asking, “What would become of us if they were?” (TWHF 297). This shocks Orual, who has 
demanded justice of the gods for years. Again, she finds that her ideas are incomplete or 
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inaccurate. If the gods are not just, then what are they? If they find her guilty, what will they do 
to her? Moreover, the Fox admits to her that he was not always honest in his teaching. He did not 
tell her that there is something in the worship of Ungit that can reach deeper than his “trim 
sentences” can (TWHF 295). Ungit may be “an image of the demon within” humanity, he says, 
but now he admits that the way of the “true gods is more like the house of Ungit” than his 
philosophy can put into words. He continues, sounding more and more like the old priest with his 
contradictions: “oh, it’s unlike too, more unlike than we yet dream, but that’s the easy 
knowledge, the first lesson; only a fool would stay there, posturing and repeating it. The priest 
knew at least that there must be sacrifices” (TWHF 295). The real gods “will have man . . . the 
very heart, center, ground, roots of a man; dark and strong and costly as blood” (TWHF 295). 
Orual learns that things may not be as they seem to human eyes. Sacrifice, though horrible to 
mortal minds, may do something deeper than she can see yet. The gods may be more beautiful, 
and yet, more terrible than she has ever permitted herself to think.  
 Orual is learning to live with paradoxes and contradictions that her rational sight cannot 
resolve. This is what Manlove calls a “synthesis through paradox” where “opposed views are 
neither exclusive nor complementary: they simply exist together, side by side, in suspension” 
(Literary 201, 195).105 In Lewis’s book about prayer, he writes about heavenly Realities, and 
how remote they are from human perspectives. Humans may form ideas about the supernatural, 
but these images must be repeatedly shattered “in mercy” (LM 109). Orual finds that the gods, 
through her dreams and visions, shatter her perceptions of reality. Manlove notes that Lewis’s 
text in Till We Have Faces, “insists that uncertainty is of the very character of reality, that if we 
look to simple, clear or vivid solutions or experiences they are not to be had” (Literary 202). The 
otherworldly Reality “is and is not,” receding always from view into denser layers of mystery.  
                                                
105 Radmacher also quotes this in her argument about the modernistic nature of Till We Have Faces (168). 
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 Orual finds that her own soul reflects the complexity of the gods, and, like the gods, it is 
often hidden from view. Here again Psyche displays a knowledge that Orual cannot touch. She 
can forgive false and foolish Redival and their angry father simply because of her knowledge 
about the hiddenness of the soul. In the prison room, facing her own death, Psyche says of 
Redival, “She also does what she doesn’t know” (TWHF 69). Later, in the same conversation, 
Psyche can see the hardness of Orual’s heart even while Orual denies it and pushes the diagnosis 
back onto Psyche herself (TWHF 75). Orual cannot see her own soul, and neither does she 
understand how she treats other people. Ansit, Bardia’s widow, tells Orual that she is “Gorged 
with other men’s lives, women’s too: Bardia’s, mine, the Fox’s, your sister’s—both your 
sisters’” (TWHF 265). After the Pillar Room dream, Orual finally embraces this self-knowledge, 
calling herself a “swollen spider . . . gorged with men’s lives” (TWHF 276). While she has veiled 
her ugly face for most of her life, she has also veiled her soul away from her rational mind. In the 
vision of the pictures, Orual watches others try to pull Psyche away from her descent into the 
deadlands. Then Orual sees a womanly figure, “its face unknown” to her, who tries to entrap 
Psyche (TWHF 303). It is herself, but Orual has so succeeded in hiding her face from everyone, 
that she cannot even recognize it herself. Even the nature of her secret love for Bardia is mostly 
unknown to her own mind. At the end, she realizes that her love was actually “nine-tenths 
hatred” for she enjoyed seeing him mocked and hurt by others (TWHF 266). She finds that once 
the “craving” for him is gone, there is only a gap left (TWHF 267). She concludes that the soul is 
like the soil where the things that “show the brightest colours and put forth the most 
overpowering smell have not always the deepest root” (TWHF 267). Her love was simply a 
covering, a name disguising the hatred and loathing below. As she awakens to further truth, this 
love becomes “a sickening thing” to her (TWHF 267). 
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 In a letter to Mary Van Deusen, Lewis writes about the hidden self in the context of 
religious faith. Lewis says that one result of faith “is an increasing awareness that what we once 
called ‘ourselves’ is only like the skin on the saucepan of boiled milk or the earth-crust on the 
fiery earth-depths” (CL III 629).106 Since faith cannot operate within the reason alone, Lewis is 
again hinting at the role of the imagination. Orual, with her awakening imagination, is 
discovering that the things she claimed as her own—her love for Bardia, her active life as the 
Queen, and her beliefs about her superiority over Psyche—are all just the fragile surface skim of 
milk and she has no idea what is really below. When the plant of Bardia-love is pulled, Orual 
feels as if her “whole soul had been one tooth and now that tooth was drawn” leaving only a gap 
(TWHF 267). Surely now, she thinks, she knows it all—she has devoured the lives of those 
around her—but she has yet to must face her jealousy of Psyche. 
 Lewis notes that jealousy is a key part of the dilemma of dividedness that humans 
experience. Some, like Psyche, will be able to embrace the tension of the seeming opposites, and 
others, like Orual, will look on and not understand. In the last vision, Orual asks the Fox whether 
they really did such horrible things to Psyche, and he answers that the pictures are all true. He 
continues, saying that Psyche  
had no more dangerous enemies than us. And in that far distant day when the gods 
become wholly beautiful, or we at last are shown how beautiful they always were, this 
will happen more and more. For mortals, as you said, will become more and more 
jealous. And mother and wife and child and friend will all be in league to keep a soul 
from being united with the Divine Nature. (TWHF 304) 
                                                
106 July 7, 1955. Also see Manlove on this topic—he notes that Lewis “deals with the native evasiveness of the soul” 
in Till We Have Faces (Literary 203). 
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Like Orual’s love for Bardia, her love for Psyche was actually hatred masquerading as love. She 
feels that Psyche was “stolen away by . . . this calling of the gods” and thus blames her jealousy 
on the gods (TWHF 291). Lewis describes this in depth in his later book The Four Loves. Orual’s 
natural, motherly love for Psyche becomes a demon that destroys Orual’s soul when it exceeded 
its bounds (FL 13). Her love actually turned into hatred through her possessiveness and 
jealousy.107 
 Some kind of transformation, then, is required if Orual is to experience the Divine Nature 
as well. The Fox tells Orual that all are born in the house of Ungit and must get free of her either 
through death or transformation (TWHF 301). Through the series of stories (Tarin about the way 
she treated Redival and Ansit’s story about Bardia), combined with the imaginative experiences 
through dreams and visions, Orual comes to see herself as Ungit: ugly of body and soul, and 
devouring of men and women. Her first solution is suicide, but she is stalled by the voice of the 
god saying, “You cannot escape Ungit by going to the deadlands, for she is there also. Die before 
you die. There is no chance after” (TWHF 279). She submits and turns away from the river, and 
thus, by her lack of resistance, realizes that she is already changing. Her next attempt at death is 
in her “passions and desire and vain opinions,” a Socrates-style death rather than physical death 
(TWHF 281). She has no success. The “old rage, resentment, gnawing fantasy” and bitterness 
continue to haunt her, and she concludes that she cannot “mend” her soul anymore than she can 
beautify her face (TWHF 282). Suddenly she has need of the gods, but again, they are distant and 
of no help. She does not realize how her growing self-knowledge is leading her deeper into an 
imaginative world capable of interacting with and experiencing Divine Reality. The very fact 
that she wants the gods to help evidences her change away from the rational, self-contained 
                                                
107 See Nancy Enright’s article, “C. S. Lewis’s Till We Have Faces and the Transformation of Love” (Logos 14:4, 
Fall 2011), for an analysis of Till We Have Faces using Lewis’s book The Four Loves. 
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Queen focused on the “god within” towards a selfhood that recognizes the need for sacrifice and 
death within the united self.  
 Orual finds that transformation cannot occur in isolation. She cannot change herself and 
must ultimately accept the sacrifice of another in order to receive beauty of face and soul. Psyche 
travels to the deadlands to complete the tasks, and the beauty she brings back is for Ungit, for 
Orual. Psyche achieves the tasks for Orual’s sake, but Orual bore the anguish and suffered for 
Psyche’s sake. Orual is also Psyche—her mind becomes united (like Psyche’s ability to embrace 
paradox), and yet she still remains separate from her sister, and at the end, sees in the pool’s 
reflection “both Psyches, both beautiful . . . yet not exactly the same” (TWHF 307-8). Orual has 
gained a self, a soul, and her rational and imaginative faculties are connected and able to work in 
consort. When the god arrives, Orual feels like she is being “unmade” and calls herself “no one,” 
and now places herself on the same plane as Psyche (TWHF 307). She no longer claims Psyche 
for her own, and is able to love freely with a love capable of sacrifice. This is real death—a real 
emptiness of self that actually elevates rather than destroys the soul. Orual has learned the “true 
wisdom” by learning the “skill and practice of death” (TWHF 281). Lewis is outlining in fiction 
Charles Williams’s idea about the fundamental vicariousness of the universe, what Williams 
called “the doctrine of co-inherence” (Gibson 253). Individuals cannot save themselves, but can 
“help paddle everyone else’s canoe” and bear the anguish for others (CL III 200).108 Orual bears 
the burden of the tasks for Psyche, not realizing until the end that all her sufferings have actually 
allowed Psyche to fulfill her wanderings with merriment and singing (TWHF 300). This enables 
Psyche to keep on, and in the end, Psyche is able to restore Orual to wholeness.  
 Just as the two sisters reach soul transformation through self-sacrifice for each other, so 
the parts of the mind must work in tandem. The reason must give place for the imagination, not 
                                                
108 Letter to Mary Van Deusen, June 10, 1952. See also a letter to Arthur Greeves on July 2, 1949. 
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lording it over, as Orual does in her disbelief and jealousy of Psyche, but giving the imagination 
freedom to roam and experience things beyond words. Orual needs to learn that Psyche’s 
experience of the god is valid and real, even though Orual cannot see what Psyche can. The 
imagination, then, needs to allow the reason to examine the new experiences and data gained 
from glimpses of reality/Reality, and to give the reason permission to codify this data into words 
whenever possible. Michael Ward refers to this as Lewis’s “three concentric circles” within the 
human person: the will at the center surrounded by the circle of the reason, which is in turn 
encompassed by the imagination (Planet 225-6). All must work together to achieve the synthesis 
of belief. 
 Lewis’s symbol of wholeness in Till We Have Faces is the face itself. The face mediates 
between the outer world and the individual’s selfhood. Once Orual has separated herself from 
Psyche, she veils her physical face and hides her soulish face. Both, she learns, are “ruinous,” 
and ugly—they are the earthly faces of Ungit. The Ungit stone presents many faces to the world; 
some devour, others provide comfort (TWHF 270). Orual’s Ungit-face devours, she finds no 
comfort in her conception of the gods, and thus she can give no lasting comfort to others. Before 
the judge, her veil is stripped away, but the judge himself remains veiled. She now must face the 
faces of all other men and women in the deadlands: “The old crone with her Ungit face stood 
naked before those countless gazers” (TWHF 289). She cannot see the face of the judge simply 
because he belongs to some other Reality than her rational mind can witness, and at this point 
she has no true face yet. The word outburst that follows when she is permitted to read her story 
strips away her inner soul veil. Finally she hears her “real voice” speaking what has been 
restlessly lying “at the center” of her soul for years (TWHF 292, 294). She has her answer: “I 
saw well why the gods do not speak to us openly, nor let us answer. Till that word can be dug out 
   
 100 
of us, why should they hear the babble that we think we mean? How can they meet us face to 
face till we have faces?” (TWHF 294). Until Orual has a face, the gods cannot answer her; they 
must remain hidden in riddles until her imaginative faculty is embraced and she can glimpse the 
real face of Reality. The final answer is to see the face of the god, and this Orual does not 
experience until after her embracing of the paradoxes of death and sacrifice that hide beyond the 
scope of her reason. The union between Psyche and Orual, and the healing of the rift between her 
reason and imagination must occur first. After this, at the end, she is brought before the god 
himself, and finds that before his “face questions die away” (TWHF 308).  
 Rational-focused Queen Orual lived with a veiled emptiness; her face was closed to all 
things that have no natural explanation. She could not account for or receive the stories of others. 
Yet, the stories begin the transformation. Psyche’s story contained a Divine Myth that Orual 
could not receive. The re-wording of that Divine Myth into the sacred story of the priest in Essur 
allows the true Orual to wake and speak, and permits memory to begin tearing down her 
carefully worded history. Writing her own story then becomes a continual sifting of soul, a 
sorting of seeds that clarifies her sight of reality (TWHF 256, 253). Tarin’s story about Redival’s 
loneliness and rejection from Orual begins her doubts about the past and her ability to record it 
accurately. Ansit’s story opens her up to the probing of the “Divine Surgeons”—when she 
receives Ansit’s story as truth, further awakening occurs and the gods move closer to her through 
dreams and visions. She accepts the destroyed nature of her face and her devouring Ungit-like 
soul. All that is “ruinous” and horrible within the depths of her imagination she accepts, and 
begins the descent from her high-pedestal of clear reason. After hearing her true voice while she 
reads her book before the judge (the text of which looks like “a vile scribble,” like a “snarl” of 
her father’s voice, and like the “ruinous faces” in the Ungit stone), she throws herself off the 
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pillar of rock into the “black sea of spectres” (TWHF 290, 296). She knows now that she has 
both a rational faculty (that it is limited and filled with mean rants of words) and an imaginative 
faculty (that is dark as earth and unclear as blood). Both need to be brought together through the 
mediation of Psyche’s sacrifice and through her own Socrates-like death. The gift of her face 
signifies the unity of mind and soul. There is no worded answer, because the real answer is 
beyond the text (and yet strangely fused within the text), hidden in Myth. Orual gains receptivity 
to story, and thus enters the Mythic Reality that Psyche is already experiencing.  
 Lewis, in the text of Till We Have Faces, transforms the earthly myth of Cupid and 
Psyche found in Apuleius’s text into his conception of a Story that contains an extra-literary 
Mythic element. He does this by combining the techniques of presentational realism and realism 
of content to move the story from the vagueness of human mythology into the specificity of the 
rational-leaning modern novel. In Lewis’s text, the Mythic elements are hidden, forcing the 
reader to share Orual’s position and question the validity of any imaginative experience of the 
gods. Lewis is arguing for the power of basic narrative, but qualifying narrative as something 
deeper than just an “image of a stable, coherent, continuous, unequivocal, entirely decipherable 
universe” (qtd. in Scott 145).109 Life (according to Crites’s theory) and story (according to 
Lewis’s thought) has a narrative component, but the stories that best approach Reality contain 
something more. Every plot must have its poetry; every linear narrative must be disrupted. 
Disruptions can trouble or delight depending upon the approach of the reader. Orual originally 
viewed stories through the lens of her reason only—she used texts and forced them immediately 
into Contemplation rather than giving space for a prior reception and Enjoyment. “After all,” 
Lewis comments in A Grief Observed, “you must have a capacity to receive, or even 
                                                
109 This is quoted from Alain Robbe-Grillet’s book For a New Novel: Essays on Fiction (New York: Grove Press. 
1965. p 32). 
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omnipotence can’t give” (54). Only those who stand in the sunlight of Enjoyment can see out 
into the huge, mad world outside the toolshed. Orual learned to “surrender” herself “with 
childlike attention to the mood of the story” and thus exercised her dormant, sleeping 
imagination into wakefulness (SMR 137). Imagination, for Lewis, is the outer circle, the one that 
touches the world and reality. If the reason works alone, it can only “use” texts, and this, 
according to Lewis, is a secondary process, inferior to “reception” (EIC 89). The user of 
literature “merely facilitates, brightens, relieves or palliates” his life, only the “receiver,” the one 
with an alert imagination, is able to “add” to his life (EIC 89). In Part I, Orual sought to “do” 
things, to make the text subservient to her own ideas; in Part II she learns to “rest in” story, 
allowing it to “mend” her ugly rift of soul and face (EIC 89). In respect to literature, “We must,” 
says Lewis, “risk being taken in, if we are to get anything” beyond our own reflections in the 
mirror (EIC 94).110 We must not be like the dwarfs in The Last Battle who choose “cunning 
instead of belief,” who wallow in the rational darkness of the stable, in a prison of “their own 
minds” (TLB 140). They are “so afraid of being taken in that they cannot be taken out” of their 
prison—they cannot enter the Reality beyond the narrow confines of their minds (TLB 140). That 
Reality, according to Lewis, is only entered through the door of the imagination, at least while 
we are residing in the Story itself. He suggests through the Fox in Till We Have Faces, “nothing 
is yet in its true form” (TWHF 305); we must learn to live with the tension between reason and 
imagination, and thereby gain a face. Only then can the imagination move within and beyond 
words, able to see the “true form,” the Myth, hidden in the text. 
 
 
                                                
110 Hart lists risk-taking as a theme of Till We Have Faces; Orual wants the security of power and answers, and 
demands these from the gods. Hart argues that Lewis emphasizes the “illusion” of any such securities, and displays 
Psyche as the risk-taker (Through 142). 
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